NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organization

Corporate Shams
Joshua D. Blank and Nancy C. Staudt

May 2012

LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
WORKING PAPER NO. 12-09

\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\87-6\nyu601.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

6-DEC-12

8:29

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 87

DECEMBER 2012

NUMBER 6

ARTICLES
CORPORATE SHAMS
JOSHUA D. BLANK† & NANCY STAUDT‡
Many people—perhaps most—want to make money and lower their taxes, but few
want to unabashedly break the law. These twin desires have led to a range of strategies, such as the use of “paper corporations” and offshore tax havens, that produce
sizable profits with minimal costs. The most successful and ingenious plans do not
involve shady deals with corrupt third parties, but strictly adhere to the letter of the
law. Yet the technically legal nature of the schemes has not deterred government
lawyers from challenging them in court as “nothing more than good old-fashioned
fraud.”
In this Article, we focus on government challenges to corporate financial plans
—often labeled “corporate shams”—in an effort to understand how and why courts
draw the line between legal and fraudulent behavior. The scholars and commentators who have investigated this question nearly all agree: Judicial decision making
in this area of the law is erratic and unpredictable. We build on the extant literature
with the help of a new, large dataset, and uncover important and heretofore unobserved trends. We find that courts have not produced a confusing morass of
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outcomes (as some have argued), but instead have generated more than a century
of opinions that collectively highlight the point at which ostensibly legal planning
shades into abuse and fraud. We then show how both government and corporate
attorneys can exploit our empirical results and explore how these results bolster
many of the normative views set forth by the scholarly and policymaking
communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine your lawyer invites you to consider the following moneymaking schemes:
(1) Join a tax protest movement and decline to file a tax
return on the grounds that the federal government has
no authority to impose taxes.
(2) Set up a “paper corporation” in a foreign tax haven to
avoid paying taxes on your local but profitable business.
(3) Purchase large assets (such as a fleet of buses, a sewer
system, or a bridge) from the City of Chicago and take
huge depreciation tax deductions that offset your business’s income. The up-front cash outlay will be small,
and city officials will retain full control of the assets.
You might respond to these schemes in a manner that goes something like this: (1) “No way!” (2) “Is that legal?” (3) “Interesting . . .
tell me more.” After all, many (perhaps most) people want to make
money and lower their taxes, but few want to unabashedly break the
law. Refusing to pay taxes under the guise of being a tax protestor is
illegal.1 Setting up an offshore business to avoid U.S. taxes seems
more acceptable but still has the unsavory feel of unlawful behavior.2
Buying and depreciating assets, however, is not only legal but routine.3 Indeed, data indicate that while most people and firms likely do
not seek to engage in outright fraud,4 quite a few have taken their
1 Willful failure to pay taxes is a violation of the law. See I.R.C. § 7201 (2006)
(explaining tax evasion); see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 207 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting that a tax protestor’s “good-faith belief” that he does not owe taxes
is a defense to the crime). For a description of the similarly willful “zero wages” position, in
which a taxpayer incorrectly claims to have no income, see IRS Announces “Dirty Dozen”
Tax Scams for 2006, I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-25 (Oct. 7, 2006), available at http://
www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Announces-%E2%80%9CDirty-Dozen%E2%80%9D-Tax-Scamsfor-2006.
2 Cf. Abusive Offshore Tax Avoidance Schemes—Talking Points, IRS.GOV, http://
www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Abusive-Offshore-TaxAvoidance-Schemes—-Talking-Points (last updated Aug. 1, 2012) (describing the agency’s
position that evading taxes by shifting liability overseas is illegal). For a brief description of
sham operations in offshore tax havens, see RONEN PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY &
CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, TAX HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 87
(2010).
3 See A Brief Overview of Depreciation, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/A-Brief-Overview-of-Depreciation (last updated Aug.
2, 2012) (discussing when and how a taxpayer can legally depreciate property).
4 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS—CIVIL PENALTIES ASSESSED
AND ABATED, BY TYPE OF TAX AND TYPE OF PENALTY—I.R.S. TAX STATS TABLE 17,
FISCAL YEAR 2011, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats—-Civil-PenaltiesAssessed-and-Abated,-by-Type-of-Tax-and-Type-of-Penalty—-IRS-Tax-Stats-Table-17
(follow “2011” hyperlink) (providing data that reveal that civil fraud penalties accounted
for .008% of all civil penalties applied by the IRS in 2011).
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lawyers’ advice to buy city assets—such as buses, light rails, bridges,
et cetera—for the sole purpose of obtaining huge depreciation tax
deductions.5
Notwithstanding a possible distinction between schemes (1) and
(2), on the one hand, and scheme (3), on the other, the government
has taken the position that all three have a common attribute: They
are all shams. More precisely, the schemes are motivated by no reason
other than tax avoidance.6 Policymakers have noted that individuals
and businesses have become alarmingly adept at using deception and
pretense to extract money from the U.S. Treasury while maintaining
the appearance of law-abiding behavior.7 The problem for the government, however, is that many sham activities are entirely consistent
with statutory and administrative law. For example, no existing statute
prohibits the purchase of city transportation equipment for tax purposes,8 and the federal tax laws clearly permit owners to depreciate
assets used in a trade or business.9 In fact, many taxpayers have purchased municipal assets for tax reasons, and these transactions are the
subject of extensive litigation in federal court, precisely because of
their strictly legal nature.10 While many policymakers view these and
other similar transactions as nothing more than fraud,11 government
5 Taxpayers have claimed more than $35 billion in tax deductions associated with this
type of depreciation transaction. See Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1194 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (citing IRS estimates). For a terrific discussion of the technique, see Robert W.
Wood & Steven E. Hollingworth, SILOs and LILOs Demystified, 129 TAX NOTES 195,
196–98 (2010), available at http://woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/SILOs_and_
LILOs_Demystified.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (“To treat a
transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business
purpose other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists.”).
7 See Press Release, Carol Guthrie, U.S. Senate Fin. Comm., Baucus Comments
on Auto Bailout Bill Provision Regarding Sale-In-Lease-Out and Lease-In-Lease-Out
Transactions (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chair
man/release/?id=f0fffec0-ef48-4c1e-8bd9-dcfa14dd95ac (quoting former Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Max Baucus describing tax shelters run by banks as a “shell game”
and “three-card-mont[e] transactions”).
8 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 946, HOW TO DEPRECIATE
PROPERTY 4 (2012), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p946.pdf (“You can depreciate
most types of tangible property . . . such as buildings . . . .”).
9 I.R.C. § 167(a) (2006).
10 See Robert W. Wood, What Wells Fargo Brings to the SILO/LILO Debate, 131 TAX
NOTES 1389 (2011), available at http://woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/What_Wells_
Fargo.pdf (discussing litigation and settlement agreements with respect to the tax plans).
11 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Fin., Grassley Expands Inquiry into Tax
Shelters Using Leases, Announces Plans to Move Up Effective Date of Legislative
Crackdown (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chair
man/release/index.cfm?id=70961c0d-d966-475e-866f-ac1b7d2aac0d (quoting Senate
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lawyers are tasked with challenging activities that, upon a literal
reading, adhere to the letter of the law.12
In this Article, we examine judicial responses to technically legal
activities that may be perceived as shams. 13 In particular, we focus on
government challenges to corporate shams.14 While corporations have
engaged in creative financial planning—or, in the government’s view,
deceit and manipulation—in a wide range of legal areas, some of the
most innovative, complex, and lucrative schemes have emerged with
the help of the tax law.15 Accordingly, we study corporate tax planning in an effort to explain how and why courts draw the line between
law-abiding and abusive activities. In doing so, we aim to identify the
factors that convince judges that certain behavior crosses the line from
legal acceptability to abusive activity in the corporate tax context.
Ultimately, we hope to offer transparency and clarity to an area of the
law long believed to be erratic, confusing, and indeterminate.16
Finance Committee ranking minority member Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, calling these shelters “just good, old-fashioned tax fraud”).
12 See, e.g., Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (contingent
liability tax shelter); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006)
(contingent liability tax shelter); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir.
2001) (foreign tax credit tax shelter); Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(straddle transactions); DeMartino v. Comm’r, 862 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1988) (straddle transactions); Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985) (sale and leaseback
transactions); Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn.
2004) (various cross-border tax avoidance transactions).
13 For an example of such a response, see Rice’s Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91.
14 Courts have utilized the term “sham” to refer to a variety of transactions. See, e.g.,
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (annuity savings bond transaction);
ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 511–12 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (sham partnership); Rice’s Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91 (sale and leaseback transaction). Our study
examines Supreme Court cases in which the government alleged that the corporate transactions at issue were abusive of tax laws in any way. For an explanation of how we identified these cases, see infra notes 140–50 and accompanying text.
15 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 25–33 (1999), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ctswhite.pdf (describing the
growth of the tax shelter industry in the 1990s); OFFICE OF TAX SHELTER ANALYSIS, IRS,
ABUSIVE CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS BACKGROUND PAPER 1 (2001), available at http://
www.quatloos.com/abbakppr.pdf (“Corporate tax shelters cost the federal government billions of dollars each year.”).
16 See Terrence R. Chorvat, Tax Shelters, Dutch Books, and the Fundamental Theorem
of Asset Pricing, 26 VA. TAX REV. 859, 874–75 (2007) (describing courts’ use of the economic substance doctrine to treat similar tax transactions in an inconsistent manner);
David P. Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter, 57 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) [hereinafter
Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter] (arguing that formulations of judicial anti-abuse doctrines “apply to everything and nothing”); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of
Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 239 (1999) [hereinafter Hariton, Sorting Out the
Tangle] (arguing that courts’ “ability to recharacterize transactions introduces considerable
uncertainty and confusion into a system that is based on the application of objective
rules”); Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of the Judicial Step Transaction Principle and a
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Further, we hope that our study—the first of its kind—will offer
insight into other legal contexts in which courts characterize ostensibly
legal behavior as abusive and fraudulent.17
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate shams by
examining both qualitative and quantitative data in an effort to understand and explain the judicial mind. Previous studies focused on a
small number of cases, contributing important insights,18 but their
narrow focus may have caused scholars to overlook decisionmaking
trends observable only with the help of a large-n dataset. Accordingly,
we reviewed every Supreme Court case issued since 1909—nearly one
thousand cases—and collected information on cases in which the government alleged the presence of a corporate tax sham. With this data
in hand, we uncovered surprising trends in the judicial decisionmaking
process. Our study shows that certain identifiable factors clearly
increase the likelihood that the Court will find that a corporation has
overstepped the bounds of acceptable financial planning and moved
into the realm of abuse. Signals of questionable behavior, for example,
Proposal for Codification, 22 AKRON TAX J. 45, 97 (2007) (“[T]here are many uncertainties pertaining to the application of the economic substance’s two prong test . . . .”); Yoram
Keinan, The Many Faces of the Economic Substance’s Two-Prong Test: Time for
Reconciliation?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 371, 373 (2005) [hereinafter Keinan, The Many
Faces] (“[C]ircuits and courts have been divided with respect to the application of this twoprong test . . . .”); Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV.
389, 391 (2010) (“Courts do not apply the [economic substance] doctrine consistently . . . .”); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to
Interpret the Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195, 195 (2001) (describing differences between judicial anti-abuse doctrines as “fairly gossamer”); David A. Weisbach, Ten
Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 228–29 (2002) (describing the lack of
consistency in the judicial application of anti-abuse standards).
17 There are numerous other legal contexts to which our study might apply. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER C. KLEIN, BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE ECONOMICS OF
SHAM LITIGATION: THEORY, CASES, AND POLICY 27–33 (1989), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/be/econrpt/232158.pdf (anti-competitive litigation); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WHEN GOOD MONEY GOES BAD: TRUE STORIES OF CONTRACT
FRAUD AT EPA 5 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/ARRA/EPA_OIG_
Grant_Fraud_Brochure.pdf (contract fraud); John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes,
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1419–20 (1997) (describing Congress’s fear of “sham transactions” involving environmental abuses); Douglass G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil
in Regulated Industries, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1165, 1179 nn.56–69 (liability avoidance);
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall
of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 21–22 (2004) (financial
accounting); Janet Tavakoli, “Standard” Credit Default Swaps on Greece Are a Sham and
It’s Not a Surprise, TAVAKOLI STRUCTURED FIN., (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.tavakoli
structuredfinance.com/Greek%20CDS.pdf (credit default swaps). For theoretical background on the avoidance of regulatory costs through planning techniques that otherwise
have little economic substance, see generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89
TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
18 See infra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of other scholars’ studies.
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include highly complex transactions,19 inconsistent tax and accounting
positions,20 and requests for large tax refunds.21 Moreover, notwithstanding the nearly obsessive attention paid by scholars and policymakers to the underlying business purpose of a transaction, our study
shows that this factor does not play the key role in the judicial decisionmaking process that might be expected.22 In short, our findings
run counter to the conventional wisdom that courts do not follow predictable patterns when deciding these cases.
Our Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview
of corporate tax abuse and describes the varied approaches to identifying the problem by the judiciary, regulatory agencies, practitioners,
and scholars. Part II.A turns to the empirical component of our project and presents our methodology and findings. Part II.B discusses
the successes and limitations of our empirical strategy. Part III investigates a series of normative and practical questions that emerge from
our findings. Part III.A explores how lawyers—those representing
both corporations and the government—can exploit our empirical
results when planning transactions and devising litigation strategies.
Part III.B then considers our findings in the context of existing scholarly views. We find that many of our empirical results bolster the normative views set forth in the current literature on how courts should
make decisions vis-à-vis corporate shams.
I
CORPORATE TAX ABUSE
A.

AND

JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY

What Is Corporate Tax Abuse?

Taxes are a prime focus of corporate cost-reduction strategies. As
discussed in detail below, tax planning offers a lucrative means to preserve corporate profits precisely because the tax law is so complex.
Corporate managers, for example, may take advantage of explicit corporate tax preferences in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and
advise their corporate clients to engage in specific activities. Such recommendations might include purchasing particular types of software
or transportation vehicles that are entitled to highly accelerated
depreciation for tax purposes.23 On the other hand, managers may
19 See infra text accompanying notes 113–21 (explaining highly engineered transactions
involving multiple parties and steps).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 103–04 (describing book-tax differences).
21 See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text (describing the implications of large
loss claims).
22 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the findings of the study).
23 See I.R.C. § 179(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (allowing a deduction for offthe-shelf software for the year it is placed in service).
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pursue tax strategies that employ hyperliteral readings of the IRC that
produce valuable tax benefits (such as tax deductions, tax credits, and
tax exemptions) without having any meaningful effect on the economic positions of their corporations. 24 The latter collection of tax
strategies is widely perceived to be “abusive” because the plans fail to
reflect economic reality and produce tax results that Congress never
envisioned.25
In the earliest forms of corporate tax abuse, corporations
deployed relatively simple strategies to obtain beneficial tax results.
For example, business taxpayers would often attempt to characterize
themselves as partnerships, which were not subject to entity-level taxation, as opposed to corporations, which were.26 In another early
strategy, corporations would frequently try to eliminate corporate taxation by disguising payments to shareholders as items that generated
tax deductions, such as rental or salary payments, even though in
reality such payments to shareholders constituted nondeductible dividends.27 Other corporations attempted to manipulate the characterization of their tax years by exploiting differences between the
calendar year and their fiscal year.28 In each of these cases, corporations aimed to exploit ambiguities in the newly forming statutory law
in order to reduce, or eliminate altogether, corporate tax liability.
Over a century after the enactment of the federal corporate
income tax,29 abusive corporate tax strategies have evolved in complexity. The mass marketing of these strategies by major accounting
firms and other tax advisors in the late 1990s and early 2000s30 led to a
corporate tax abuse boom that commentators described in terms such

24 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 15, at 11–24 (describing the characteristics of
corporate tax shelter transactions).
25 See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 16, at 396–98 (arguing that “abusive” transactions
are those which are inconsistent with congressional intent).
26 See, e.g., Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925) (holding an
unincorporated association taxable as a corporation).
27 See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Comm’r, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946) (rejecting a corporation’s characterization of payments as deductible interest expenses).
28 See, e.g., Sec. Flour Mills Co. v. Comm’r, 321 U.S. 281, 287 (1944) (rejecting a corporation’s attempt to manipulate its taxable year to avoid a tax).
29 The federal corporate income tax was enacted by the Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, ch.
6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
30 See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES
1775, 1781 (1999) (noting the extensive competition between marketed tax shelters); Janet
Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X-rated Tax Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 14, 1998, at
198, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1998/1214/6213198a.html (describing the
promotion of corporate tax shelters).
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as an “epidemic,”31 a “crisis,”32 and a “beast” that must be
“slay[ed].”33 Modern corporate tax abuse strategies often involve multiple transaction steps, parties, and tax jurisdictions. An abusive corporate tax strategy today, for instance, may feature a transaction in
which a corporation purchases millions of dollars of stock, sells that
stock back to its original owner several minutes later, and then claims
millions of dollars in foreign tax credits.34 Or it may involve multiple
steps in which a corporation participates in a transaction with a
Luxembourg bank that enables it to increase its tax basis in stock,
which it then sells to a third party, generating a large tax-deductible
loss.35 The government maintains a list of tax strategies that it believes
constitute corporate tax abuse.36 The list contains dozens of colorfully
named strategies, such as COBRA (currency options bring reward
alternatives),37 PICO (personal income company),38 BOSS (bond and
options sales strategies), and Son-of-BOSS (option position transfers).39 While the latest forms of abusive corporate tax strategies are
certainly more sophisticated than their predecessors, their basic objective—avoidance of corporate tax liability through an application of
tax law that Congress never envisioned—remains the same.

31 Frontline: Tax Me if You Can (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2004) (referring to a
tax shelter “epidemic”) (transcript available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
tax/etc/script.html).
32 See Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA.
TAX REV. 1, 62 (2004) (“[T]extualism has affected the practice of tax law and has contributed to the recent tax shelter crisis.”).
33 Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. & Alan J.J. Swirski, Gilbert S. Rothenberg: Interview, ABA
SEC. TAX’N NEWS Q., Winter 2010, at 4, 7.
34 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (adjudicating this type of a “dividend-stripping” tax shelter).
35 See IRS Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129 (identifying this type of a “basis-shifting”
tax shelter).
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2010). The IRS maintains the list of
abusive tax shelters on its website. See Abusive Tax Shelters and Transactions, IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Abusive-Tax-Shelters-and-Transactions (last
updated Aug. 2, 2012).
37 I.R.S. Notice 2002-35, 2002-1 C.B. 992 (describing contingent payment swaps). This
transaction was marketed as “Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives” by Ernst &
Young in the late 1990s. See S. REP. NO. 109-54, at 77–78 (2005).
38 I.R.S. Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690 (describing a “foreign currency straddle”
involving a Subchapter S corporation). This transaction has been described as “Personal
Income Company” or “PICO.” See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Two Minutes to
Midnight: Settle Your Shelter Case, TAX NOTES, Feb. 21, 2006 (identifying the transaction
described in IRS Notice 2002-65 as PICO).
39 See IRS Offers Settlement for Son of Boss Tax Shelter, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/
uac/IRS-Offers-Settlement-for-Son-of-Boss-Tax-Shelter (last updated Aug. 2, 2012).
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Anti-Abuse Standards

Corporate tax abuse is distinct from other forms of tax noncompliance because its legitimacy is judicially determined ex post. To
appreciate this distinction, consider corporate tax behavior that
involves the violation of an explicit tax rule, such as claiming a
fraudulent tax deduction for a business expense that never actually
was incurred, an activity that is illegal ex ante.40 In other words, a
clear tax rule informs corporate managers that a tax position is prohibited before they claim it on a corporate tax return. Now consider a
tax strategy that corporate managers believe—or at least convince
themselves they believe—complies with the literal language of the
IRC. Although no explicit rule in tax law prohibits a corporation from
claiming the resulting tax benefits, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) may challenge the strategy and ask a court to declare it abusive
ex post on the ground that it enables the corporation to obtain unintended tax benefits that clash with the IRC’s revenue-raising policy
objectives. 41 The most prominent anti-abuse standards that courts
apply when considering whether or not to respect corporate tax strategies ex post are described briefly below.
Sham Transaction Doctrine. Under the “sham transaction” doctrine, a court may disallow a taxpayer’s claimed tax treatment if it
determines that the substance of the underlying transaction at issue
lacked any purpose other than tax avoidance.42 For example, if a corporation’s tax position in a particular year stemmed from the corporation’s purchase of treasury notes, but the corporation did not actually
purchase the notes, a court could reject the corporation’s tax position
as a sham.43
Economic Substance Doctrine. The precise contours of the “economic substance” doctrine have varied historically from court to
court.44 But under this doctrine, many courts will respect a corporation’s claimed tax treatment of a transaction only if (1) the
40 I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2006) (describing the felony offense of willfully making false statements in a tax return).
41 See Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L.
REV. 539, 543–44 (2009) (distinguishing ex ante rules from ex post standards).
42 See, e.g., ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(holding that a partnership was a sham used to avoid tax); Goodstein v. Comm’r, 267 F.2d
127, 131–32 (1st Cir. 1959) (holding that a borrowing transaction lacked economic
substance).
43 See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1960) (rejecting an annuity savings bond transaction between a taxpayer and an insurance company as a sham when the
transaction served no interest besides tax reduction).
44 See infra notes 75–92 and accompanying text (discussing the economic substance
doctrine).
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corporation possessed a non-tax business purpose in pursuing the
transaction and (2) the transaction meaningfully improved the corporation’s economic position (apart from reducing its tax liability).45
Substance over Form Doctrine. Consistent with the principle that
the government should not tax economically similar transactions differently, a court may also apply the “substance over form” doctrine.
In doing so, the court ignores the transaction’s form and instead taxes
the transaction based on its underlying economic substance.46 The
government may invoke this doctrine, but courts historically have
barred corporate attorneys from using it strategically in court to
abandon the chosen legal form of a transaction.47
Step Transaction Doctrine. Lastly, the “step transaction” doctrine
enables a court to reject a corporation’s tax position by integrating a
“series of formally separate ‘steps’ as a single transaction” and then by
applying the appropriate tax treatment to the integrated transaction.
48 The effect of this integration is often to treat portions of the transaction—individual steps—as if they never occurred, thereby eliminating the sought-after tax benefits. This judicial anti-abuse standard
appears in several forms.49
45 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247–48 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that an
“objective analysis of the actual economic consequences” and “subjective analysis of their
intended purposes” indicate that the appellant failed to satisfy the economic substance
doctrine). For a discussion of the development of the economic substance doctrine, see
generally Lederman, supra note 16, at 402–16. This judicial anti-abuse standard originated
in Gregory v. Helvering, in which the Supreme Court held that the transaction at issue (a
corporation’s distribution of a subsidiary’s stock to its controlling shareholder followed by
the sale of that stock, resulting in capital gains instead of dividend treatment) lacked a nontax business purpose and was inconsistent with Congress’s intent underlying the relevant
statutes. 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935); see also Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 366 (applying the economic substance doctrine to reject an annuity savings bond transaction between a taxpayer
and an insurance company as a sham, when the transaction served no interest besides tax
reduction).
46 See, e.g., Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938) (finding the distribution to shareholders to be “meaningless and unnecessary” and “transparently artificial”).
47 See Comm’r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (“[A] party can challenge
the tax consequences of his agreement as construed by the Commissioner only by adducing
proof which in an action between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter
that construction . . . .”).
48 Penrod v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987).
49 For example, under the “binding commitment” test, a court may integrate one transaction with a second transaction if there was a binding commitment to undertake the
second transaction at the time of the first transaction. See, e.g., J.E. Seagram Corp. v.
Comm’r, 104 T.C. 75, 98 (1995). The “interdependence” test provides that two transactions
should be integrated if the legal relationships created by the first transaction would be
meaningless without the completion of the second transaction. See Redding v. Comm’r,
630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980). The “end result” test enables a court to integrate a
transaction’s steps if the court determines that the corporation intended to undertake the
separate steps simply to achieve a specific end result. See, e.g., King Enters. v. United
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Judicial Uncertainty

Tax lawyers and scholars have commented for generations that
the courts often apply anti-abuse standards in unpredictable ways.50
Some commentators focus on the vague elements incorporated into
particular standards (such as the business purpose requirement),
arguing that as a result of their breadth, these standards “apply to
everything and nothing.”51 Others focus more closely on the difficulty
of distinguishing among the various standards—for example, they
claim that different versions of the step transaction doctrine are not
very different from one another.52 Many highlight cases that involve
similar facts but that nonetheless result in different judicial outcomes.53 Regardless of their specific criticisms, many commentators
argue that the possible application of one or more judicial anti-abuse
standards introduces uncertainty into the practice of corporate tax
planning.54
To better comprehend the difficulty in differentiating between
transactions that represent corporate tax abuse from those that
represent legal corporate tax avoidance, consider two well known
Supreme Court decisions involving corporate tax planning:
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. 55 and Cottage Savings Ass’n v.
Commissioner.56
States, 418 F.2d 511, 519 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (finding an initial exchange of stock and subsequent
merger to be a unified transaction when the merger was intended from the outset).
50 See, e.g., Sheldon I. Banoff, Mr. Popeil Gets ‘Reel’ About Conversions of Legal
Entities: The Pocket Fisherman Flycasts for “Form” but Snags on “Substance,” 75 TAXES
887, 888 (1997) (“Substance controls over form, except where form controls over substance.”); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible
Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 346 (describing judicial
uncertainty but refuting contention that judicial decisions are no more consistent than
“coin tossing”); Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C,
52 TAX LAW. 457, 499 (1999) (“[D]ifferent transactional forms having identical (or near
identical) substances often have differing tax consequences . . . .”); see also supra note 16
(describing a variety of inconsistencies in tax abuse doctrine).
51 Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter, supra note 16, at 3. For a discussion of the business purpose requirement, see infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
52 For discussion of the different versions of the step transaction doctrine, see supra
note 49. Professor Martin McMahon argues that “any fair minded person would have to
admit that those differences are often fairly gossamer.” McMahon, supra note 16, at 195.
53 See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle, supra note 16, at 239 (describing “uncertainty” in corporate tax planning); Weisbach, supra note 16, at 228 (commenting that government victories in corporate tax abuse cases were “mere coincidence, much like baseball
teams on a streak”).
55 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
56 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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In the former, the Court Holding Company held appreciated real
property, which its managers wanted to sell.57 If the Court Holding
Company had sold the property itself, it would have incurred tax on
the sale of the property and its shareholders would have incurred a
second tax liability on the distribution of any proceeds from the sale.58
The management of the Court Holding Company, however, devised
an alternative tax strategy. 59 They advised the Court Holding
Company to distribute the real property first to its shareholders as a
dividend distribution, which at the time (1940)60 did not cause the
Court Holding Company to recognize gain. The shareholders then
sold the property to the ultimate purchaser.61 By preventing the corporation from playing the part of seller, the Court Holding Company
eliminated the corporate-level tax on the transaction and thus saved
the shareholders substantial money. In response, the government
argued that the shareholders had merely acted as agents or conduits of
the corporation. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that it would not
allow the “true nature of [the] transaction to be disguised by mere
formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities.”62
Almost fifty years later, in 1991, the Court decided Cottage
Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner.63 In that case, the taxpayer, a savings
and loan association, owned single-family home mortgages that had
declined in value as a result of a rise in interest rates.64 If the savings
and loan association had attempted to sell the mortgages, it would
have suffered a real economic loss.65 To avoid that loss, the managers
designed a transaction that would allow it to incur only a tax loss. The
transaction involved a swap with a group of other lenders: The association traded its depreciated single-family home mortgages for nearly
identical mortgages held by the other lenders.66 As a result of the economic similarity between the two groups of mortgages, the savings
and loan association did not incur a real economic loss and reported
57

Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 332–33.
Id. at 333.
59 Id.
60 Prior to 1986, corporations could distribute appreciated property to shareholders
without recognizing corporate-level gain. See Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering,
296 U.S. 200 (1935). In 1986, Congress overruled the General Utilities doctrine by enacting
a statute that required corporations to recognize gain on the distribution of appreciated
property. I.R.C. § 311(b) (2006).
61 Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 333.
62 Id. at 334.
63 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
64 Id. at 556.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 557.
58
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no loss for regulatory or accounting purposes.67 The key to the
strategy was that, even though the association’s economic position did
not change, the swap transaction allowed it to claim a $2.4 million tax
loss.68 The government asserted that the tax loss should be disallowed
on the grounds that the underlying transaction failed to satisfy the
economic substance doctrine.69 Unlike the result in Court Holding,70
however, the Supreme Court sided with the taxpayer, allowing the tax
loss even though the exchange of mortgages was economically
meaningless.71
While these cases resulted in different judicial outcomes, it is not
at all clear why the Supreme Court applied a judicial anti-abuse standard in Court Holding but refused to apply one in Cottage Savings.
The taxpayer in each case pursued transactions for the sole purpose of
avoiding corporate tax liability in both cases, and the transactions that
they entered into had no real economic effect. Moreover, the government set forth similar arguments in its briefs seeking to bar the taxpayer from obtaining the desired tax benefits.72 The record in both
cases shows that the taxpayers clearly intended to avoid federal
corporate tax liability rather than to serve a non-tax-related business
purpose.73 Consequently, when comparing cases involving judicial
anti-abuse standards, commentators often find the possible reasons
for the disparate outcomes to be “inscrutable.”74
Commentators also attribute unpredictable corporate tax abuse
decisions to courts’ inconsistent application of particular anti-abuse
67

Id. at 558.
Id.
69 Id. at 562.
70 Id. at 334.
71 Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 566 (1991) (allowing the taxpayer’s
claimed tax loss on the exchange of participation interests in mortgages).
72 Compare Brief for the Respondent at 34, Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S.
554 (1991) (No. 89-1965) with Brief for the Petitioner at 29–30, Comm’r v. Court Holding,
324 U.S. 331 (1945) (No. 581). Commentators have attempted to offer distinctions between
cases like these—for instance, the taxpayer’s transaction in Court Holding was unrelated to
any ongoing ordinary business, while the taxpayer’s transaction in Cottage Savings was part
of an ongoing mortgage business. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance
Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 17 (2000) (“[T]he swap in Cottage Savings, while economically insignificant in itself, was tied to ordinary business operations, and what was measured for substantial economic effect was not just the swap, but the business operations to
which it was tied.”). Yet the presence of an ongoing business is not a requirement of any of
the judicial anti-abuse standards.
73 See Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 333; Brief for the Respondent at 29, Cottage Savings,
499 U.S. 554 (No. 89-1965) (describing the petitioner as entering into “these transactions
‘solely’ for the purpose of tax avoidance”).
74 See, e.g., Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle, supra note 16, at 240 (“The efforts to tease
out what the taxpayers did wrong in these cases and distinguish them from what taxpayers
did right in other cases have been wholly inscrutable.”).
68
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standards, especially the economic substance doctrine.75 While some
courts have required satisfaction of both prongs of the economic substance doctrine,76 other courts have required that the taxpayer show
that a particular transaction achieved either a non-tax-related business
purpose or had the potential to generate an economic profit.77 Some
courts have refused to apply the economic substance doctrine completely.78 As one commentator has written, “The result is a test that
does little to distinguish tax shelters and other abusive transactions
from legitimate ones.”79
Judicial outcomes over the past decade support the view that corporate tax abuse is an uncertain area of the law. In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, corporate taxpayers lost their cases at the trial level in
United Parcel Service of America v. Commissioner,80 Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Commissioner,81 and IES Industries, Inc. v. United
States.82 In each of these cases, the trial court applied one of the
75 See, e.g., id. at 239 (noting that courts’ “ability to recharacterize transactions” leads
to uncertainty); Keinan, The Many Faces, supra note 16, at 373 (noting variation in the
application of the two-prong test); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Economic Substance,
Purposive Activity, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 94 TAX NOTES 1017, 1017 (2002) (referring
to the economic substance doctrine, among other judicial anti-abuse standards, as “a useless mechanistic test”); Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It
Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 94 TAX NOTES 511, 518 (2002) (criticizing an application of the economic substance doctrine).
76 See, e.g., Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 171–74,
186–87 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that the litigated transaction lacked both the expectation
of economic profit and a non-tax-related business purpose); see also Yoram Keinan, It Is
Time for the Supreme Court to Voice Its Opinion on Economic Substance, 7 HOUS. BUS. &
TAX L.J. 93, 95 (2006) (describing Long Term Capital Holdings as applying this test).
77 See, e.g., Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91–92 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding
that a taxpayer’s characterization of a sale and leaseback transaction will be rejected if the
transaction “was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in
entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no
reasonable possibility of a profit exists”). In other words, under the version of the economic substance doctrine articulated by the Rice’s Toyota court, if the taxpayer had
demonstrated satisfaction of one of the prongs, the taxpayer’s transaction would have been
respected as having economic substance. See also Black & Decker Corp. v. United States,
340 F. Supp. 2d 621, 623–24 (D. Md. 2004) (holding a similar outcome in a contingent
liability transaction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006); Monte A.
Jackel, Summary of Economic Substance Case Law, PLI ORDER NO. 27151, THE
CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE SERIES: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPINOFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2011, at
431–83 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2011), available at 954 PLI/Tax 431-1 (West) (describing
Rice’s Toyota as applying the “disjunctive test”).
78 See, e.g., Coltec Indus. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004), vacated, 454 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding the application of the economic substance doctrine to be an
unconstitutional violation of separation of powers).
79 Lederman, supra note 16, at 391.
80 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999), rev’d, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
81 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev’d, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
82 84 A.F.T.R.2d 99-6445 (N.D. Iowa 1999), rev’d, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
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judicial anti-abuse standards to reject the taxpayer’s claimed tax treatment. On appeal, however, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision in each case and held in favor of the corporate
taxpayer.83 Several years later, however, the opposite string of events
occurred. In 2004, the government lost a trio of high-profile corporate
tax abuse cases at the trial level: Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States,84 Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States,85 and TIFD III-E, Inc.
v. United States.86 Again the courts of appeals reversed the trial court
decisions, this time holding in favor of the government in each case.87
The split between trial courts and appellate courts provides further
evidence that judges may unevenly apply the judicial anti-abuse standards when determining whether or not a tax strategy represents corporate tax abuse.
3.

Economic Substance Codification

Congress enacted legislation in 2010 in response to the courts’
inconsistent application of the economic substance doctrine.88 The
legislation created a standard that courts must apply in cases where
they determine the economic substance doctrine to be relevant: They
must treat a transaction as possessing economic substance if it changes
the taxpayer’s economic position in a meaningful way (apart from tax
effects) and if the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from tax
reasons) for entering into the transaction. 89
While the new legislation creates a uniform economic substance
doctrine, many commentators believe that it has little chance of
83 United Parcel Serv. of America v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001);
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 253 F.3d 350, 359 (8th Cir. 2001).
84 340 F. Supp. 2d 621, 624 (D. Md. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 436 F.3d 431 (4th
Cir. 2006).
85 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004), vacated, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
86 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 121–22 (D. Conn. 2004), rev’d, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006).
87 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 493 (4th Cir. 2006); Coltec
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006); TIFD III-E, Inc. v.
United States, 459 F.3d 220, 241 (2d Cir. 2006).
88 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067–68 (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. IV 2010)).
89 Id. In addition, to deter taxpayers from entering into abusive corporate tax strategies, Congress also enacted a 20% tax penalty that applies whenever a taxpayer loses a tax
benefit as a result of the application of the economic substance doctrine or “any similar
rule of law.” I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (Supp. IV 2010). The tax penalty increases to 40% in the
case of nondisclosed transactions. I.R.C. § 6662(i) (Supp. IV 2010). Taxpayers are not entitled to raise reasonable cause as a defense to these new tax penalties, effectively making
them strict liability tax penalties. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2010).
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reducing inconsistent judicial outcomes.90 First, courts must still reach
subjective determinations, such as whether a particular business purpose is “substantial” and whether a change in a taxpayer’s economic
position is “meaningful.”91 Second, the new statute provides that
“[t]he determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is
relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if this
subsection had never been enacted.”92 In other words, if a judge
decides not to apply the pre-statute economic substance doctrine, she
does not have an obligation to apply this particular judicial anti-abuse
standard now.
B.

Red Flags and Smell Tests

Predicting whether a court will apply a particular judicial antiabuse standard, or any standard at all, is challenging. While one court
may respect the separate, independent steps of a taxpayer’s transaction, a different court may review the same transaction and determine
that the steps should instead be viewed, and taxed, as one.93 Figure 1
draws on the insights of Professor Kyle Logue94 and illustrates the
challenge of identifying transactions that may be characterized as
“abusive” by describing the judicial characterizations that may apply
to corporations’ tax reduction strategies:

90 See David Hariton, Has Codification Changed the Economic Substance Doctrine?, 2
COLUM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 5 (2011) (“[C]odification has almost no substantive
effect.”); Richard M. Lipton, ‘Codification’ of the Economic Substance Doctrine—Much
Ado About Nothing?, 112 J. TAX’N 325, 333 (2010) (speculating that the codified economic
substance doctrine will be viewed as “a continuation of the status quo”).
91 I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 2010).
92 I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (Supp. IV 2010).
93 See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing inconsistent judicial approaches). As Judge Learned
Hand famously wrote in Helvering v. Gregory, “Any one may so arrange his affairs that his
taxes shall be as low as possible.” 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). Yet, in the same opinion,
before rejecting the taxpayer’s claimed treatment, Judge Hand offered the contradictory
statement that “the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as
a melody is more than the notes.” Id. at 810–11.
94 Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain,
27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 251–52 & 252 fig.1 (2007) (presenting a useful continuum of uncertainty in tax abuse cases similar to our Figure 1); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and
the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 360 fig.1 (2005) (same).
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FIGURE 1
CORPORATE TAX PLANNING

CONTROVERSIES
Legal

Legal, ex ante

Illegal

At the left end of the continuum are legal activities. This category
includes clearly permissible tax positions, such as a corporation’s decision to apply the correct tax rate to its established tax liability.95 This
category may also include more aggressive, yet permissible, strategies.
For example, a corporate parent may deliberately commence a complete liquidation of its corporate subsidiary at a time when it owns less
than 80% of its vote and value, even though the corporate parent will
eventually acquire 100% ownership, solely to enable the subsidiary to
recognize a tax loss on the distribution of depreciated property.96 At
the right end of the continuum are clearly illegal activities, such as a
corporation’s decision to claim a business expense for high salary
expenses that it never actually incurred. The middle section of the
continuum represents corporate tax abuse: tax positions that are consistent with the letter of the tax law and are legal ex ante, but do
produce tax benefits for the corporation that Congress did not intend
and thus may be viewed as abusive ex post. Individuals involved in
corporate tax planning expend significant effort endeavoring to determine ex ante whether a court would view a particular tax strategy as
crossing the aggressive but legal line—that is, the line between legal
corporate tax minimization (on the left side of the continuum) and
abusive corporate tax evasion (in the middle of the continuum).
Given the uncertain nature of the judicial anti-abuse standards,
individuals disagree on the factors that are most critical to a court’s
decision to reject a corporation’s claimed tax treatment. In this
Subpart, we examine the respective methodologies that three different groups of individuals—government officials, practitioners
95 See I.R.C. § 11(a) (1994) (stating that, under the I.R.C., a tax is imposed “for each
taxable year on the taxable income of every corporation”).
96 See, e.g., George L. Riggs, Inc. v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 474, 489 (1975) (“[S]ection 332 is
elective in the sense that with advance planning and properly structured transactions, a
corporation should be able to render section 332 applicable or inapplicable.”); see also
I.R.C. § 332(a) (2006).
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representing taxpayers, and scholars—have applied when engaging in
this inquiry.
1.

Government Officials

Government officials have identified several factors that they
believe are relevant to determining whether or not a court will respect
a corporation’s tax position. One source of these factors is the broad
set of disclosure requirements with which corporations (and other
types of taxpayers) must comply.97 Under these rules, corporations
must file special disclosure forms with the IRS whenever they engage
in transactions that bear certain “red flag” traits.98 The purpose of
these disclosure forms is to enhance the detection efforts of the IRS.99
In addition, these disclosure requirements indirectly reveal the types
of factors that government officials believe would influence a court in
a tax controversy. Another source of government officials’ beliefs is
the IRS’s internal administrative guidelines. The guidelines explain
how IRS agents should address the newly codified economic substance doctrine and related tax penalties.100 The following are some of
the most significant factors that appear in the IRS’s administrative
guidance:
Loss Transactions. The government requires corporations to file
a special disclosure form whenever they claim a $10 million or greater
loss in any single taxable year.101 Not every tax loss claimed by a corporation is the result of corporate tax abuse, but government officials
believe large tax losses signal the possibility of corporate tax abuse. In
addition, government officials believe that courts are likely to view a
97

Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(e) (as amended in 2007).
Id. The law requires a taxpayer to file a disclosure statement with the IRS Office of
Tax Shelter Analysis if the taxpayer has participated in any reportable transaction during
the taxable year. See Sheryl Stratton, Inside OTSA: A Bird’s-Eye View of Shelter Central at
the IRS, 100 TAX NOTES 1246, 1246–47 (2003). Taxpayers are also required to attach the
disclosure statement to their annual tax returns. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(e)(1) (as amended
in 2007).
99 See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1637–42 (2009) (describing “red flag” tax shelter detection strategy).
100 See Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Economic Substance
Doctrine and Related Penalties, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Guidance-forExaminers-and-Managers-on-the-Codified-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-RelatedPenalties (last updated Aug. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Guidance for Examiners and Managers].
For a discussion of the guidance issued by the IRS to its agents regarding how economic
substance penalties should be applied, see Economic Substance Guidance Issued to IRS
Examiners, J. ACCT., Oct. 2011, at 70.
101 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(A) (as amended in 2007). A corporation must file the
same disclosure form whenever it claims a loss of $20 million or more in “any combination
of taxable years.” Id.
98
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tax strategy as abusive if the underlying transaction enables the corporation to “accelerate[ ] a loss or duplicate[ ] a tax deduction.”102
Book-Tax Differences. Corporations have two distinct income
reporting mechanisms. They report income for tax purposes on their
federal tax returns (taxable income), but they also report income in
corporate financial documents for purposes of informing shareholders
and potential investors (book income).103 Large corporations are
required to reveal and explain differences between these two types of
income by filing a special disclosure form with the IRS.104 This
requirement indicates that policymakers believe that a court should
consider book-tax differences in a corporation’s treatment of a particular item when determining whether the corporation engaged in an
abusive tax strategy.
Third Parties. IRS administrative guidance documents also indicate that a court may find the application of the economic substance
doctrine appropriate in cases when a corporation’s transaction did not
feature arm’s length dealings with third parties.105
Economic Change. Finally, the IRS states that the application of
the economic substance doctrine may be appropriate for transactions
that create “no meaningful economic change on a present value basis”
before considering tax consequences.106 This statement confirms that
government officials believe that courts may reject tax positions that
lack corresponding real-world economic effects.
2.

Tax Practitioners

Corporate tax lawyers devote significant time and energy to
advising clients on the likelihood that courts will either (1) respect
their transactions as consistent with the tax law or (2) label them as
abusive. The most preeminent corporate tax lawyers are often the
most confident in their ability to predict whether a particular corporate tax reduction strategy will pass the judicial smell test. For
example, when commenting on a series of cases in the late 1990s in
which courts rejected corporations’ tax positions as abusive, M. Carr
Ferguson, an experienced practitioner, queried: “Was it really so
102

See Guidance for Examiners and Managers, supra note 100.
For a general discussion, see Mihir A. Desai, The Divergence Between Book Income
and Tax Income, in 17 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 169 (James M. Poterba ed., 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11538.pdf.
104 Large corporate taxpayers, those with total assets of $10 million or more, file a
Schedule M-3 form with the IRS. This form requires them to reconcile inconsistencies
between income they report for income tax and financial accounting purposes. See I.R.S.
Form 1120, Schedule M-3 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120sm3.pdf.
105 See Guidance for Examiners and Managers, supra note 100.
106 Id.
103
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difficult for counsel planning the taxpayers’ transaction in those recent
cases to make this prediction?”107 Peter Canellos, another seasoned
practitioner, described the prognostic ability of experienced tax lawyers even more directly: “Although in theory the line between a tax
shelter and an aggressively structured real transaction may appear difficult to draw, in actuality the distinction is generally rather easy.”108
Some of the factors that many “experienced tax professionals”109
believe will cause a court to designate a corporation’s tax strategy as
abusive are described as follows:
Business Purpose. When practitioners analyze the probability
that a court will apply a judicial anti-abuse standard to unwind a corporation’s transaction, they often focus on the strength of the business
purpose underlying the transaction.110 As Ferguson argued, courts are
likely to respect transactions that “are grounded on long-understood
principles of business purpose and economic substance.”111 Regarding
the specifics of the type of purpose that a transaction should serve,
Canellos advised: “Real transactions, most obviously, have as their
origins and purpose making money in the short-run or the long-run by
increasing revenues or reducing (non-tax) expenses.”112 For tax practitioners, business purpose (apart from tax avoidance) is often one of
the most important factors considered when analyzing the potential
judicial merits of the tax treatment of the transaction.
Multiple Parties and Convoluted Steps. Another factor that tax
practitioners tend to consider is whether a transaction involves more
than one party and thus has the resulting potential to lead to complex,
or as some might say, “convoluted,”113 transaction steps. Gary Wilcox,
a practitioner at a large firm, explained: “Multi-step transactions
designed to achieve a favorable tax result are often subject to more
107 M. Carr Ferguson, Senior Counsel, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2000 Erwin N.
Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel: How Will a Court Rule?,
in 53 TAX LAW. 721, 730 (2000).
108 Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business
Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47,
53–54 (2001).
109 See id. at 51 (describing the ease with which “experienced tax professionals can usually readily distinguish tax shelters from real transactions”).
110 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Glickman & Clark R. Calhoun, The “States” of the Federal
Common Law Tax Doctrines, 61 TAX LAW. 1181, 1189 (2008) (defining the business purpose doctrine and explaining the importance of the question, “How much business purpose
is enough?” to the business purpose analysis (internal quotation marks omitted));
Kevin M. Keyes, Evolving Business Purpose Doctrine, in 26 TAX STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS,
REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2007, at 643 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2007).
111 Ferguson, supra note 107, at 730.
112 Canellos, supra note 108, at 52.
113 See Weisbach, supra note 16, at 232.
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rigorous scrutiny when the results are significantly different
depending on whether the steps are respected or collapsed.”114 Tax
practitioners are especially wary of constructing tax strategies that
contain “unusual contrived steps”115 or that involve “accommodation
parties,”116 such as tax-exempt or foreign entities, which corporations
often use to absorb taxable income resulting from their overall
transactions.117
Timing of Steps. When predicting whether a court will respect the
steps separately or characterize them as a single transaction, tax practitioners often analyze not only the presence of multiple steps, but
also the timing of these steps.118 One critical question that tax practitioners often consider is the amount of time that occurs between
steps.119 As one practitioner explained: “The amount of time elapsed
between transactions . . . will also be important with respect to
whether transactions are stepped together. The shorter the period the
more likely transactions will be stepped together.”120 Lewis Steinberg,
another established practitioner, commented that if the steps of a
transaction occur too close in time to one another, a court may view
certain entities or steps as having “transitory existence”121 and disregard them completely.
Choice of Forum. In addition to the factors described above, tax
practitioners make predictions regarding the likelihood that a court
would respect a corporation’s tax position by considering the type of
court that would review the transaction.122 Some tax practitioners
believe that a corporation might fare better with a generalist judge in
114 Gary B. Wilcox, How and When To Apply Step Transaction Doctrine in Corporate
and Partnership Restructuring Transactions, 24 REAL ESTATE J. 266, 266 (2008).
115 Canellos, supra note 108, at 52.
116 Id. at 54.
117 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730 (describing an intermediary corporation tax shelter).
118 See, e.g., AARON D. RACHELSON, Step-Transaction Doctrine—Planning To
Avoid the Step-Transaction Doctrine, in CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS AND
DIVESTITURES § 5:22 (2012), available at Westlaw CAMD; Mark J. Silverman, Recent
Developments in the Step Transaction Doctrine, in PLI ORDER NO. 35322, TAX LAW AND
ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, NEW YORK CITY FEB. 27–28, 2012
(Practising Law Inst ed., 2012), available at 975 PLI/Tax 89 (West); Richard W. Bailine,
The Step Transaction Doctrine: Not Just a Matter of Time, 30 CORP. TAX’N 50, 52 (2003).
119 See Bailine, supra note 118, at 52–54 (discussing the ramifications of timing classifications); Steinberg, supra note 50, at 496 n.181 (incorporating timing into the consideration
of a multistep approach); Wilcox, supra note 114, at 270–71 (explaining the minimum time
period).
120 RACHELSON, supra note 118, at § 5:22.
121 Steinberg, supra note 50, at 479.
122 See, e.g., Joel V. Williamson et al., Modern Tax Controversies, in PLI ORDER
NO. 27151, THE CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE SERIES: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS,
DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
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a district court rather than a judge with tax expertise at the Court of
Federal Claims, whereas others believe that litigating in Tax Court
may produce the most favorable result for the corporation. Practitioners of the former category focus on whether the corporation’s
transaction was motivated by a strong non-tax business purpose, while
practitioners of the latter category focus on whether a client’s case
hinges on winning a highly technical argument.123
3.

Tax Scholars

Finally, we consider the expectations of the academic community.
Tax law scholars generally do not advise clients on transaction structures or issue legal opinions. Instead, scholars tend to make normative
claims with respect to how judges should decide corporate tax abuse
cases and then provide prescriptive suggestions, such as concrete tests
that judges should apply or legislation that Congress should enact.
Implicit in these normative and prescriptive arguments, however, are
positive claims regarding judicial behavior in corporate tax abuse
cases. Several of these implicit positive claims are described below.
Intent. Scholars have implicitly argued that judges in corporate
tax abuse controversies focus excessively, even incorrectly, on arguments regarding the intent of the taxpayer.124 Professor Leandra
Lederman, for example, has criticized the current economic substance
decisions for “shift[ing] from a focus on congressional intent to a focus
on the taxpayer’s intent,”125 and others, including Professor Martin
McMahon, have echoed this view.126 In addition, Professor Shannon
RESTRUCTURINGS, at 478-9 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2011), available at 957 PLI/Tax 478-1
(West) (discussing forum selection strategies in corporate tax shelter litigation).
123 Compare Marshall W. Taylor et al., How to Choose the Right Forum in Tax
Litigation, PRAC. LAW., June 1991, at 39, 46–47 (discussing comparative judicial expertise),
with Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts and
General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 138 (2005) (“[T]ax
court judges should be able to use their expertise to premise their decisions less on ideological grounds and more on the facts and the law. In contrast, the district court is likely to
show a greater reliance on IRS expertise, and . . . on relevant court-of-appeals decisions.”).
The underlying theory with respect to a generalist judge versus a judge with tax expertise is
not investigated in this project, which focuses exclusively on the Supreme Court. We hope
to investigate this theory about trial court judges in future work focusing on corporate
abuse cases in lower federal courts.
124 See Lederman, supra note 16, at 389 (criticizing courts’ focus on taxpayer intent);
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 715 (arguing that intent-based standards,
such as the business purpose doctrine, have “proved troublesome and the courts’ application of the doctrine is remarkably inconsistent”).
125 Lederman, supra note 16, at 389.
126 See McMahon, supra note 75, at 1017 (“The classic Supreme Court jurisprudence
supports the application of a ‘purposive activity’ test that is closer to the analysis employed
by the Tax Court in corporate tax shelter cases.”).
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Weeks McCormack has offered a detailed policy proposal, which
would focus the attention of judges who hear corporate tax abuse controversies on the purpose of the tax laws.127 Regardless of the specific
policy prescription offered, each of these scholars implicitly has
argued that judges in corporate tax abuse cases do not examine
adequately the intent of the legislators who drafted the applicable tax
statutes, as judges instead excessively scrutinize the intent of the taxpayers in structuring and implementing their transactions.
Textualism and Justice Scalia. Another implicit positive claim that
some scholars have offered relates to textualism128 and its increasing
importance for judges. As the text of the statute begins to take precedence over all other interpretive methodologies, the number of corporate tax abuse cases in court has risen. For example, when describing
corporate tax abuse cases, Professors Noël Cunningham and James
Repetti argued: “The recent proliferation of tax shelters has, at least
in part, been facilitated by the ascendancy of textualism,” and that
textualism “has dramatically affected the practice of tax law.”129 Further, scholars point to the judicial appointment of Justice Antonin
Scalia as having an effect on corporate tax abuse controversies.130 As
Professors Dean and Solan have commented in the context of corporate tax abuse: “Since his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986,
Justice Scalia’s ‘new textualism’ has been seen as a challenge to an
intent-oriented approach to statutory interpretation.”131
Alternative Proposals. Finally, tax scholars have offered a
plethora of judicial, administrative, and legislative proposals for controlling corporate tax abuse.132 They believe that their proposals
127

See McCormack, supra note 124, at 720–31.
For an introduction to textualism, see generally Antonin Scalia, Common Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 3 (1997).
129 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 32, at 2–3.
130 See, e.g., id. (describing the general effect of textualism on tax jurisprudence).
131 Steve A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Between
Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879, 885 (2007).
132 See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax
Shelters: Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L.
219 (2004) (shaming); Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Essay, Tax Shelters
and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005) (loss disallowance rule);
Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and the Question of Pre-tax Profit, 26 VA.
TAX REV. 821 (2007) (consideration of implicit taxes in economic substance analysis);
Lederman, supra note 16 (congressional intent-based inquiry); McCormack, supra note
124 (purposive approach); Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps, 55
TAX L. REV. 289 (2002) (enhanced tax shelter disclosure); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 569 (2006) (self-adjusting penalty); Jay A. Soled & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., A Little
128
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would be more successful than judicial anti-abuse standards, which are
unable to “protect the collection of income tax from assault by abusive shelter planners.”133 By offering these alternatives, scholars
implicitly argue that judges in corporate tax abuse controversies fail to
apply the current anti-abuse standards in a reliable and effective
manner.
C.

The Stakes of Judicial Uncertainty

As the discussion thus far reveals, judicial decisionmaking in corporate tax abuse controversies is grounded in a range of interrelated
anti-abuse standards. These standards appear to govern in a highly
uncertain fashion. Government regulators, practitioners, and scholars
have proffered a wide range of views with respect to judicial decisionmaking in the corporate tax abuse context, but there is no consensus
as to what courts actually do. Our study adds to the positive literature
but adopts a different approach. Whereas the previous studies have
focused on a small collection of cases and provided qualitative
insights, we have collected the entire population of corporate tax
abuse cases litigated in the U.S. Supreme Court and used quantitative
methods in an effort to understand how the Justices view corporate
tax abuse. Before proceeding to our own study, we briefly consider
what is at stake in this area of the law and the potential benefits of
adding an empirical study to the already vast extant literature on the
topic.
First, judicial decisionmaking directly affects the negotiation of
tax controversy settlements between the IRS and taxpayers. When
IRS agents audit and then challenge a corporation’s tax position, the
parties negotiate in the shadow of litigation. Moreover, both corporate tax lawyers and IRS Appeals Division officers must make predictions regarding how a judge will respond to various factors present in
the taxpayer’s case while negotiating a settlement. The IRS explicitly
Shame Might Just Deter Tax Cheaters, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008, at A11 (shaming); see
also Bankman, supra note 72, at 29 (substantive law reform if nature of corporate tax
shelters changes); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax
Information Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 95, 111–13 (2005) (shaming);
Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial
Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J. 423, 472–83 (2009) (50% adjustment of taxable income towards financial accounting income for public corporations);
David A. Weisbach, Disrupting the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 971, 974
(2007) (broad-based anti-abuse standards); cf. Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of
the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006) (transparency within corporate decisionmaking groups); George Yin, The Problem of Corporate
Tax Shelters: Uncertain Dimensions, Unwise Approaches, 55 TAX L. REV. 406 (2002)
(reform of judicial anti-abuse standards).
133 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 132, at 1962.
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considers the “hazards of litigation” when deciding issues such as the
floor settlement offer that they are willing to accept134 and whether to
seek the imposition of tax penalties.135 A better and more informed
understanding of how judges actually decide corporate tax cases could
encourage settlement and simultaneously prevent parties from
accepting inappropriate settlement offers. A large-n quantitative
study will add to the qualitative research discussed above by uncovering judicial decisionmaking trends that explain outcomes but that
are hidden in a qualitative case-based approach.
Second, the behavior of judges in corporate tax abuse cases, as
perceived by tax practitioners and corporate managers, has a major
impact on corporate planning of a wide array of transactions,
including ordinary business transactions.136 If courts do not privilege
the features that tax practitioners tend to view as supremely important, such as the presence of a business purpose, corporations may
pursue unnecessary actions and incur unnecessary costs in order to
avoid the application of judicial anti-abuse standards.137
Third, academic proposals addressing corporate tax abuse are
often reactions to judicial behavior.138 For example, in order to fix
perceived problems with the intent-based business purpose standard,
several scholars have proposed alternative methods of statutory interpretation.139 Without more information regarding how judges actually
act in these cases, it is difficult to determine which of these proposals
should be explored further.
In this Article, we do not express a normative view on whether
judicial uncertainty in corporate tax abuse cases is beneficial or
harmful; other scholars have considered this question in great depth.
Rather, we investigate the extent to which judicial decisionmaking is
characterized by identifiable trends or is, in fact, uncertain and erratic,
as many scholars and commentators have argued.

134 See David M. Fogel, The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals Division, 99 TAX
NOTES 1503, 1503–04 (2003) (discussing the “hazards of litigation” analysis).
135 See Taylor et al., supra note 123, at 42–43 (noting some considerations that shape the
decision to seek an increased deficiency or penalty).
136 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing judges’ effects on corporate planning).
137 For discussion of the social cost of unecessary actions, see Weisbach, supra note 16,
at 222–23.
138 See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 124, at 720–31 (presenting a policy proposal following a criticism of intent-based judicial standards).
139 See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (describing scholars’ proposals).
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II
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX ABUSE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
A.

The Data and the Models

In this Part, we seek to fill a void in the extant literature with a
new study that explores the factors that influence judicial decisions in
corporate tax abuse controversies. More specifically, we investigate
U.S. Supreme Court cases decided between the years 1909 and 2011
involving allegations of corporate tax abuse.
1.

Data Collection Strategy

To identify and analyze corporate tax abuse we designed a data
collection process with the following three steps:
(1) Collect the superset of Supreme Court cases involving
any type of federal taxation issue (that is, issues relating
to individuals, corporations, nonprofit entities, and so
forth) decided by the Court between the years 1909 and
2011.140
(2) Identify the subset of federal taxation cases involving
corporate tax issues.
(3) Identify the sub-subset of cases involving alleged corporate tax abuse.
In the first step of our strategy, we found 919 federal tax cases
decided during our period of interest. For purposes of the second step,
we read each of the 919 opinions and determined that 40% (n = 364)
involved a corporate tax controversy—that is, one that involved corporate rather than individual tax liability. Our third and final step
required us to identify yet another subset—cases that alleged corporate tax abuse. Because the third prong of our data collection process
entailed a more complex procedure than the first two prongs and also
goes to the very heart of our project, we elaborate on our methodology below.
140 We identified these cases in a Lexis search. The search that we conducted read as
follows: (federal w/s tax!) or (excise w/s tax!) or (estate w/s tax!) or (user w/5 fee) or (user
w/s tax!) or (tax! w/s fraud) or (irc) or (i.r.c.) or (stamp w/s tax!) or (income w/s tax!) or
(internal w/s revenue) or (tax! w/s lien) or (tax! w/s code) or (tax! w/s evad!) or (tax! w/s
evasion) or (corporate w/s tax!) or (payroll w/s tax!) or (employment w/s tax!) or (social w/
s security) or (26 usc) or (26 u.s.c.) or (tax! w/s refund) or (tax! w/s deficiency) or (unemployment w/s tax!) or (gift w/s tax!) or (fica w/s tax!) or (f.i.c.a. w/s tax!). We then read each
case and identified those that involved a federal tax controversy; we excluded the cases
that did not interpret the federal tax code, such as those that merely referred to the code or
involved state and local taxation issues.
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Allegations of Corporate Tax Abuse: Why They Are Important
and Where To Find Them

Our discussion in Part I suggested that while scholars and commentators widely agree that corporate tax abuse exists, there is no
universally accepted definition of the phenomenon—which creates
high levels of uncertainty in the federal courts. Paradoxically, this fact
does not pose a problem for our empirical study. Because we only
seek to understand the factors that explain Supreme Court decisions,
we need not settle on a single definition of corporate tax abuse.
Rather, we need identify only the cases in which the government
alleged abuse and then determine how the Justices reached a decision
in the controversy. Put more directly, our project investigates how and
why the Justices reach particular legal conclusions when the government argues that a corporation claimed an inappropriate tax position
through an abusive tax strategy.
Accordingly, in the third and final step of our data collection process we focus on the group of corporate tax cases in which the government alleged abuse—not only on the cases in which the Court actually
found abuse. By adopting this strategy, we are able to examine all of
the factors alleged by the government vis-à-vis abuse and determine
which factors were (and were not) convincing to the Justices when
they granted or denied the tax benefits sought by a corporate taxpayer. It is important to examine the entire collection of cases in
which the Court could have found abuse in order to fully understand
the outcomes.141 We seek to explain why the government wins and
loses the cases it litigates in the Supreme Court.
To see why this approach to data collection is essential to our
project, consider a hypothetical study in which a research team seeks
to identify the factors that explain the Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) results. The hypothetical research team does not seek to
describe the successful students, but rather to identify the factors that
differentiate the successful group from all other test-takers. If the
investigators conduct their study by focusing only on the group of
high-scoring students and ignore those who failed the exam, their
empirical findings would likely be seriously flawed. Spurious results
would emerge because the researchers would not possess the
appropriate sample of students; in order to differentiate high-scoring
141 See Barbara Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get:
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, 2 POL. ANALYSIS 131 (1990) (providing useful
examples for a selection bias problem that emerges when portions of data are purposefully
excluded from studies); see also PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 286–87
(2003) (discussing various selection problems that can produce biased results).
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from low-scoring students, both groups must be represented in the
study.
Similarly, in our project, we do not examine only the cases in
which the government succeeded in convincing the Court to find tax
abuse. Rather, we examine all the cases which included allegations of
corporate tax abuse and seek to discern the factors that led the Court
to find corporate tax abuse in only some. With this strategy, we will be
able to understand and explain how the Court conceptualizes the
problem of corporate tax abuse and better understand the types of
transactions perceived to be problematic and against public policy.
More importantly, our strategy will enable us to predict how the
Court will respond to future transactions challenged by the government as abusive. Again, if we examined only the cases in which the
Court found abuse, we would be unable to accomplish these goals
because the data would not permit comparative analytics.142
From an empirical standpoint, it is quite obvious that we must
investigate all of the cases in which the government alleged abuse in
order to understand the Supreme Court’s decisions. But identifying
this large collection of cases poses a difficult data collection problem.
Recall from above that the first step of our data collection process
identified 919 federal taxation cases in the Supreme Court, and in the
second step, we read the 919 opinions and identified 364 as corporate
tax cases. Now, in the third step, we must identify the subset of corporate tax cases that involved alleged corporate tax abuse. To do this, it
was not possible to rely on the judicial opinions, because the Court
often passes on legal issues without expressly addressing all the claims
set forth in the brief, including allegations of abuse. Accordingly, for
purposes of our third step of the data collection process—and to identify the cases in which corporate tax abuse was alleged (but not necessarily found by the Court)—we turned to the government’s briefs filed
with the Court.143
We read the government’s legal arguments presented in Court filings in each of the 364 corporate tax cases, and found that few of the
documents explicitly referred to corporate tax abuse. Indeed, only two
briefs filed over the course of the last century referred to a corporate
tax “shelter.”144 More often, when describing perceived inappropriate
142

See supra note 141.
We accessed these briefs through the Thompson/Gale Corporation’s database, “U.S.
Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832–1978,” and through the Lexis-Nexis collection of
“Court Records, Briefs and Filing Sources” for the briefs filed after 1978.
144 Brief for the United States at 9, Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978) (No.
76-1137). The government’s brief in the 2012 case, United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC, also references tax shelters—but this case is not in our dataset because the
143
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corporate behavior, the government used terms such as “distortion,”145 “avoidance,”146 “manipulation,”147 “evasion,”148 “taxmotivated,”149 and so forth. In our review of the legal arguments, we
focused on the cases in which the government argued that these types
of transactions and tax positions should be viewed as abusive, even
though one could argue that they were legal under a hyper-literal
reading of the tax law. Through this process, we found that 38% (n =
137) of the corporate tax controversies involved government allegations of abuse.150 As we discuss in detail below, the government did
not prevail in all 137 cases. The empirical question that we seek to
answer, therefore, is this: What are the factors that lead the Court to
agree with the government in some of these cases but to reject the
claims of abuse in others?
Before moving to the statistical models that we use to answer this
question, it is useful to describe the cases that we plan to analyze.
Figure 2 depicts the three groups of cases uncovered in our data collection efforts. The light grey area denotes the superset of 919 tax
cases decided over the course of the last century, the dark grey area
denotes the set of 364 corporate tax cases, and the black area indicates
the subset of 137 corporate tax abuse cases as defined above.

specific issue to be addressed by the Supreme Court involves a procedural issue, the statute
of limitations, and not the abusive nature of the tax shelter. Brief for the United States at 5,
6, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139).
145 Brief for the Respondent at 19, Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299 (1932) (No.
80).
146 Brief for the Petitioner at 25, Helvering v. Nat’l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938)
(No. 723); Brief for the Petitioner at 17, McLaughlin v. Pac. Lumber Co., 293 U.S. 351
(1934) (No. 125).
147 Brief for the Petitioner at 33, Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935) (No.
174); see also Brief for the Respondent at 42, Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 491
U.S. 244 (1989) (No. 88-396) (“manufacture . . . tax losses”).
148 Brief for the Respondent at 8, First Chrold Corp. v. Helvering, 306 U.S. 117 (1939)
(No. 385).
149 Brief for the Respondent at 26, Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382 (1998)
(No. 97-147).
150 Both authors read the 364 corporate tax cases to identify the subset of corporate tax
abuse cases. Our inter-coder reliability was high: We reached initial conflicting decisions in
a small number of cases but upon review easily reached a consensus on these cases. We
then re-read the briefs to confirm our initial coding decisions.
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FIGURE 2
GROUPS OF TAX CASES ON THE SUPREME COURT
DOCKET FROM 1909 TO 2011

Figure 2 indicates that controversies in each set and subset—tax
cases, corporate tax cases, and corporate tax abuse cases—have
appeared on the Supreme Court’s docket in every era. While the
number of cases in each category spiked in the early- to mid-1900s, the
decreasing frequency of tax cases reflects a decrease in the size of the
overall docket—not the relative importance of taxation. In fact, federal tax issues have comprised roughly 5% of the Supreme Court’s
docket nearly every year over the course of the last century.151 That
the Justices believe tax cases raise important legal questions is evident
by the justifications set forth for granting review. In more than a few
opinions, the majority has noted that tax cases raise important issues
for both taxpayers and for the administration of the nation’s revenue
laws;152 the Court has also noted that abuse cases are particularly
151 See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, Peter Weidenbeck, René Lindstädt & Ryan J.
Vander Wielen, Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1926–29
(2005) (presenting data and graphs on the size of the Supreme Court’s docket).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 549 (1993) (“Because of the importance
of the issue to the federal fisc, we granted certiorari.”); United States v. Atlas Life Ins., 381
U.S. 233, 239 (1965) (“We granted certiorari to consider this important question relating to
the taxation of life insurance companies.”); Magruder v. Wash., Balt. & Annapolis Realty,
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important to review because they generate heavy litigation in the
lower courts. 153
In analyzing the various cases in our data set, we observed that
corporations have sought to avoid paying taxes with the help of clever
strategies since the adoption of the modern corporate tax laws in 1909
(if not earlier), although the tactics have evolved over time. For
example, the 1913 case McCoach v. Minehill & Schuylkill Haven
Railroad involved an incorporated railroad company that sought to
avoid paying corporate taxes by leasing its assets to a secondary company and then distributing the rental income directly to its shareholders. 154 Minehill argued that because its financial activities did not
reflect typical corporate behavior, it should not be viewed as a corporation for tax purposes.155 In Hellmich v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,
decided in 1927, the Missouri Pacific Railroad used inter-corporate
barters and trades in an effort to avoid the receipt of income and thus
the burden of the corporate income tax.156 Forty years later, the Court
decided Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, in which a corporation claimed substantial and questionable depreciation deductions
on its property and then proceeded to sell the property (which had
appreciated) in a complete liquidation, thereby enabling the corporation to decrease its ordinary income in the short term and avoid capital gains altogether in the long term.157 The most recently decided
abuse case in our collection, United Dominion Industries, Inc. v.
United States,158 involved a group of related companies filing a consolidated return. The companies adopted a single entity approach to calculate product liability losses rather than a method that calculated
each affiliate’s losses separately, which would have worked to their tax
disadvantage.159 The government argued in its brief that the position
advocated by companies “would permit significant tax avoidance
abuses”160 and further observed that as the “Court emphasized in a
316 U.S. 69, 72 (1942) (“We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in
the administration of the revenue acts.”).
153 See, e.g., Thor Power Tool v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 522, 525 (1970) (“We granted certiorari to consider these important and recurring income tax accounting issues.”).
154 228 U.S. 295, 297–300 (1913).
155 Id. at 304–05 (holding that because Minehill was not actively engaged in the railroad
business, it should be exempt from the corporate tax).
156 273 U.S. 242, 247–49 (1927).
157 Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Comm’r, 383 U.S. 272, 274–79 (1966) (explaining, though
ultimately rejecting, the government’s account of the corporation’s questionable tax
practices).
158 532 U.S. 822 (2001).
159 Id. at 827–28.
160 Brief for the United States at 12, United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532
U.S. 822 (2001) (No. 00-157).
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case that involved a similar abuse, ‘the mind rebels against the notion
that Congress in permitting a consolidated return was willing to offer
an opportunity for juggling so facile and so obvious.’ ”161 These are
just a few examples of the types of transactions that the government
has challenged in Court, arguing that the statute may not be used to
“defeat the manifest purpose of Congress” in raising revenue.162 In
short, while the form of a transaction or a position taken on a tax
return may be perfectly legal ex ante, the government may nonetheless believe the corporation adopted an abusive position and thus
should be denied the tax benefits it seeks ex post.
3.

Three Statistical Models

In an effort to understand and explain Supreme Court decisionmaking in the corporate abuse context, we created three separate statistical models. In the first model, we investigate how the government
fares in the Supreme Court in abuse cases versus all other types of tax
controversies. More specifically, we seek to determine whether the
government is more (or less) likely to prevail in the Supreme Court in
cases where it alleges corporate tax abuse compared to cases that do
not involve such allegations.
The abuse cases, obviously, are a subset of the tax cases generally
and the corporate tax cases particularly. Thus, our second model compares the outcomes in cases where the government alleged abuse to
cases in which the government set forth non-abuse grounds for
denying the taxpayer its preferred tax position. Put most directly, our
first two models seek to determine whether or not, on average, the
Justices favor—or disfavor—the government in controversies that
involve transactions that conform to the letter of the tax law but that
are inconsistent with legislative intent and the general revenue-raising
goals imbedded in the tax law. We conceptualize our empirical questions more formally with the help of two statistical models:
Pr(AllTaxOutcomei=1) = b 0 + b 1CorporateAbusei + Sb jC ij + e

(1)

Pr(CorporateTaxOutcomei=1) = b 0 + b 1CorporateAbusei + Sb jC ij + e

(2)

AllTaxOutcome i in equation (1) is the Court’s decision in a given federal tax case (raising any type of issue, corporate or not) and is coded
to be 1 if the government prevails and 0 otherwise. CorporateTax
Outcome i in equation (2) is the Court’s decision in a given corporate
161
162

174).

Id. at 13 (citing Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 330 (1932)).
Brief for the Petitioner at 34, Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935) (No.
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tax case and is coded to be 1 if the government prevails and 0
otherwise.
In both equations, CorporateAbuse i is a variable indicating
whether the government contended in its Supreme Court brief that a
corporation engaged in an abusive transaction or took an abusive
accounting position and is coded to be 1 if such an allegation was
made and 0 otherwise. C ij in both equations represents a collection of
five control variables that scholars have already found to affect judicial outcomes in the taxation context. The first is Defense Spending:
One of the authors of this study has previously found that spikes in
the nation’s defense spending leads the Court to issue a greater
number of pro-government decisions in tax cases.163 The second is
Government Is Petitioner: Various other scholars have found that
when the government is the petitioner (and not the respondent) in the
Supreme Court, the Justices are more likely to reach outcomes in
favor of the government and against the taxpayer.164 The third is
Judicial Political Preferences: Republican-appointed Justices appear to
favor the corporation over the government in the tax cases.165 Fourth
and fifth are State of the Economy and Year: We control for these in
163

See generally NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE (2011). For purposes of our study, the variable Defense Spending is coded equal to the nation’s defense
spending in 2009 dollars, in ten billion dollar increments.
164 See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage:
Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 408–11 (2000); Stephanie A.
Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme
Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 144–57
(2006) (investigating the effects of the Solicitor General’s participation on case outcomes).
The variable Government Is Petitioner is coded 1 if the government is the petitioner in the
U.S. Supreme Court and 0 otherwise.
165 See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of
Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1815–21 (2006). The variable
Judicial Preferences is coded to be 1 if a Republican president appointed the majority of
the Justices and 0 otherwise. We used this admittedly very rough measure because it was
the only available measure for early Justices in our database. Other more sophisticated
measures of judicial preferences exist, but are not available for the Justices on the Court as
early as 1909. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL.
ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (discussing Martin-Quinn scores for measuring judicial preferences);
Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C.
L. REV. 1275 (2005) (same). Others have examined judicial measurement issues with great
insight. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not To Lie with Judicial Votes:
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813 (2010) (discussing the
uses and abuses of judicial measures); see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (moving beyond judicial politics to the role of
public opinion on judicial outcomes); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84
TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) (discussing the value of accounting for judicial preferences in
normative scholarship).
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the year that the decision was rendered in order to capture any influences that may affect the Court’s outcome but are not directly
included in our model.166
The variable of interest in our two preliminary models is
CorporateAbuse. The coefficients on CorporateAbuse will indicate
whether corporate tax abuse cases are easier or harder to win for the
government compared to the other types of tax cases that the
Supreme Court decides. In the abuse controversies, as discussed
above, both the government and the corporate taxpayer have viable
legal arguments. The government argues that the corporation should
not obtain the tax consequences it desires because tax laws should not
be used in a manner that undermines their legislative intent and
revenue-raising potential. The taxpayer, by contrast, argues that it followed the letter of the law and thus is entitled to its preferred tax
outcome. We expect that the government will encounter more difficulty prevailing in cases that rest primarily (or solely) on public policy
considerations related to abuse, compared to other types of cases that
implicate, for instance, disputes associated with statutory or regulatory interpretation. Accordingly, we predict that the coefficients on
CorporateAbuse will be negative: b 1 < 0. When the government
alleges abuse, the probability that the government will prevail will
decrease.
Models (1) and (2) investigate a very simple question: Does the
government have an easier or more difficult time winning corporate
tax abuse cases than other types of tax cases that it litigates in the
Supreme Court? The more interesting inquiry—and the point of this
study—attempts to identify the factors that are most likely to convince
the Court to decide in favor of the government when abuse is alleged.
After all, we expect the government to have a more difficult time winning abuse cases, but we know it does win sometimes. To answer our
question, we must focus exclusively on the 137 abuse cases that we
identified in the data collection process and use a statistical model that
166 The variable State of the Economy is coded to be 1 if the economy is growing and 0 if
the economy is in a state of recession, as measured by the NBER Dating Committee. For a
discussion of this variable, see Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic
Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A Macro-theory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009).
The variable Year is the year in which the decision was argued.
In earlier versions of this study, we included a control for the court in which the controversy originated on the theory that the Justices may give more deference to the experts
on the Tax Court (than to the generalist district court judges). The variable, however, did
not produce statistically significant or robust results. Our dataset as currently constructed
does not identify how the trial court ruled (or whichever venue made this ruling) but only
how the appellate court decided the tax issue—thus the Justices’ views of the appellate
court cannot offer insight to their views of the substantive trial court outcomes. We plan to
investigate this issue in future empirical studies.
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will predict and explain when and why the government wins in this
subset of controversies.
For purposes of answering our empirical question, we again
investigated the legal briefs filed in the Supreme Court.167 We found
that when government lawyers seek to convince the Court to invoke
an anti-abuse doctrine, they routinely point to a small collection of
very specific facts and circumstances.168 Three of the factors are tied
to the nature of the transaction itself and two are linked to the position taken by the corporation on its tax return filed with the IRS.
These five factors are: (1) the presence of third parties in the transaction; (2) multistep transactions; (3) the lack of a business purpose
other than tax avoidance; (4) accounting irregularities, such as booktax differences; and (5) a claim for a tax refund on the initial return.
We found, as indicated in Table 1 below, that the government cited to
at least one of these factors in 81% of all the corporate tax abuse
controversies litigated in Court. The briefs also indicate, as expected,
that the government will point to these factors both alone and in
tandem in an effort to win its case.
TABLE 1
INDICIA OF CORPORATE TAX ABUSE AND FREQUENCY
ALLEGATION IN THE GOVERNMENT’S BRIEFS

Indicia of Corporate Tax Abuse
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Third Party
Multistep Transaction
Lack of Business Purpose
Accounting Irregularity
Request for Tax Refund

Any Indicia169
No Indicia
Total Observations

167

OF

Number of Government’s
Briefs Which Raised
Allegation
65
50
34
39
19

(47%)
(36%)
(24%)
(28%)
(14%)

111 (81%)
26 (19%)
137 (100%)

See supra note 143 (explaining the database we used).
See supra Part I.B.1. A recent government publication also lists the characteristics of
abusive corporate tax strategies. We relied on this to identify the factual claims set forth by
the government with respect to its abuse arguments. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE
PROBLEM OF TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS, AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
(1999).
169 We can parse the data even further. Roughly 37% of the cases had at least one
indicium, 20% of the cases had two indicia, 20% had three indicia, and 3% had four indicia
of tax abuse. None of the cases had all five factors alleged.
168
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In addition to the facts and circumstances alleged in the briefs,
scholars have argued that the government is less likely to prevail after
1986. As we discussed earlier, Professors Noël Cunningham and James
Repetti, among others, imply that Justice Scalia’s ascension to the
Supreme Court in 1986 and the attendant rise in the plain meaning
approach to statutory interpretation have had an effect on judicial
outcomes and votes.170 Allegedly, Justice Scalia increases the
probability that a corporate taxpayer will prevail (and the government
will lose) because abusive tax strategies tend to adhere literally to the
tax law. Thus, the plain meaning approach works to the corporation’s
advantage in front of the post-1986 Supreme Court.
Because the primary goal of this study is to determine what role
the facts and circumstances listed in Table 1 (along with the appointment of Justice Scalia) had on the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking
process in the 137 corporate tax abuse cases, we must set up a model
that incorporates all these variables. To identify the effects of interest,
we have derived the following:
Pr(CorpAbuseOutcomei=1) = b 0 + b 1ThirdParty + b 2MultiStep +
b 3NoBusPurpose + b 4AccountingIrreg
+ b 5RefundClaim + b 6JusticeScalia
+ Sb jC ij + e
(3)

CorpAbuseOutcome i is the Court’s decision in a case involving alleged
corporate tax abuse. It is coded to be 1 if the government prevails and
0 otherwise.171 Note that we are now focused solely on the corporate
tax abuse cases. No other cases are included in this part of our investigation, because it is only the corporate tax abuse cases that raise the
first four allegations found on the right side of equation (3). We will,
of course, investigate all of the variables on the right side of the equation in an effort to determine what effect, if any, they have on
Supreme Court decisionmaking.
The primary variables of interest in this study are ThirdParty,
MultiStep, NoBusPurpose, AccountingIrregularity, and RefundClaim,
170

See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 32.
Investigating court outcomes is useful because it indicates the ultimate winner of the
dispute. Thus, if we can identify factors that explain when and why one party prevails over
the other, we will advance the extant understanding of how courts decided tax abuse cases.
This approach, however, obscures the views of the individual Justice and the factors that
help to explain individual, rather than institutional, behavior. In the future, we will investigate the individual Justice’s vote in each case. For now, however, it is useful to note that
our work in other venues suggests that the empirical findings with respect to individual
Justices’ voting strongly confirms the findings with respect to outcomes. See generally
STAUDT, supra note 163 (exploring both case outcomes and individual Justices’ votes in a
study of taxation cases generally and finding a similar empirical result).
171
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and are all coded to be 1 if the government alleged the factor and 0
otherwise. The variable JusticeScalia is also a binary variable equal to
1 if the year the Court heard oral arguments was post-1986 and 0 otherwise. Finally, C ij is the same collection of control variables discussed
above with respect to models (1) and (2).172 As to our modeling
expectations, we have developed the following hypotheses. The presence of third parties, multi-step transactions, the lack of a business
purpose, accounting irregularities, and refund claims are all indicia of
corporate tax abuse, and consequently we expect that the presence of
these variables will increase the likelihood that the Justices will side
with the government. They will positively correlate with judicial outcomes—thus, when they are present the likelihood that the government will prevail will increase. We expect the presence of Justice
Scalia to negatively correlate with judicial outcomes, because his
approach prioritizes the plain meaning of the tax statute over public
policy concerns. Thus, when Justice Scalia is on the Court, the government will be less likely to win. Formally, we expect to find b 1, b 2, b 3,
b 4, and b 5 > 0, and b 6 < 0. It is useful to note here that if we are unable
to uncover the factors that correlate with judicial outcomes (or if they
correlate in unexpected ways) then the scholarly argument that corporate tax abuse controversies generate unpredictable results will be all
the more convincing.
B.

Empirical Findings

In this Subpart, we turn to our empirical findings. We seek to
determine whether our models explain Supreme Court decisionmaking, or whether we should reconceptualize the process that leads
to a pro-government or pro-taxpayer outcome in the cases of interest.
At the outset, we wish to note a few nuances with respect to the interpretion of our results. We use probit models173 and the tables below
depict our statistical findings using this type of model. Because probit
coefficients are difficult to interpret,174 we present our results in a
172

See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
Probit models are necessary because the dependent variable is binary. A large literature discusses the advantages of using a probit (or a logit) model over a linear probability
model with a binary dependent variable. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 141, at 259–61
(using a linear probability model and producing estimated probabilities outside the 0–1
range); J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 34–84 (1997) (using a linear probability model with a binary
dependent variable necessarily violates many of the underlying assumptions of the former,
including those associated with heteroskedasticity, normality, and functional form).
174 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 588 (2006) (“[F]rom a practical perspective the most difficult aspect of logit or
probit models is presenting and interpreting the results.”); see also JACK JOHNSTON &
173
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different format: The findings reflect the marginal change in the
probability that the government will win a case given a unit increase in
the independent variable.175 Recall that we explained above how we
coded each variable of interest—this is important information if our
results are to be interpreted correctly. For example, a positive sign on
a coefficient presented in a table below indicates that as the independent variable increases (or moves from 0 to 1 if it is binary), the government is more likely to win; a negative sign indicates that the
government is less likely to win as the independent variable
increases.176
1.

Corporate Tax Abuse Cases Versus Other Types of Tax Cases in
the Supreme Court

To begin our investigation, we focus on models (1) and (2) set out
above, which enable us to compare how the government fares in the
corporate tax abuse cases vis-à-vis all other types of tax cases that are
litigated in the Supreme Court. We theorized that allegations of abuse
are not winning arguments in the High Court.177 Our results appear to
confirm this hypothesis, albeit not always at a statistically significant
level. Column (1) of Table 2 indicates that the government is 7% less
likely to win a corporate tax abuse case than other tax cases generally.
Column (2) indicates the government is 8% less likely to win a corporate tax abuse case compared to corporate tax cases raising alternative
legal issues. Neither of these results is statistically significant, even at
the 0.10 level. But, our dataset includes Supreme Court controversies
decided over the course of the last century, which raises the question
of whether our results would be the same if we examined a subset of
cases decided in the more recent era. We discuss this issue in greater
JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 422 (1997) (noting that probit coefficients are
difficult to interpret and arguing that “it is not generally useful merely to report the coefficients from a probit (as it is for a linear probability model) unless only the sign and significance are of interest”); LONG, supra note 173, at 61–83 (discussing four interpretive
approaches).
175 We generated these probability estimates by transforming the probit coefficients
with the “dprobit” command in STATA. See 2 STATA CORP., STATA BASE REFERENCE
MANUAL: RELEASE 9, K-Q, at 475–77 (2005) (discussing dprobit as a useful means for
transforming probit coefficients into easily interpreted probabilities). The marginal effects
are calculated for each variable, holding all other variables at their mean. The original
probit models have an intercept, but we use “dprobit” and thus do not report marginal
effects for the intercept on the theory that this would make no sense given all the variables
are held at the mean with the “dprobit” command.
176 For example, we coded the variable CorpTaxAbuse to be 0 if the government did not
allege abuse in the case and equal to 1 if the government did make such an allegation.
Thus, if the sign on the CorpTaxAbuse variable is positive (negative) then the presence of
such an allegation makes it more (less) likely that the government will win.
177 See supra Part II.A.3.
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depth below.178 For preliminary purposes, we reexamined the cases
decided after World War II and presented our findings in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 2 below. Our results show an even stronger, and significant, negative correlation: The government is 18% less likely to
prevail in the post–World War II period when it alleges corporate
abuse. This finding is statistically significant in both models at the 0.05
level, indicating strong empirical evidence that the type of argument
set forth in the government’s briefs has an effect on outcomes.179
Our findings suggest that, as expected, the Supreme Court is sympathetic to corporations that adhere to the letter of the tax law, even if
the transactions and tax positions undermine the revenue-raising
potential of the tax law. It is, in short, more difficult for the government to prevail when all parties agree that the corporate taxpayer
complied with the formal tax rules, yet the government alleges that
the taxpayer nevertheless engaged in abuse.
TABLE 2
CORPORATE TAX ABUSE CASES ARE MORE DIFFICULT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO WIN
U.S. Supreme Court Outcomes
Results depict change in the probability of a pro-government outcome, given
a unit increase in the independent variable

Explanatory Variable

All Tax
Cases
(1)

Corporate
Tax Cases
(2)

All Tax
Cases
PostWWII
(3)

Corporate Tax Abuse
Case

-.07
(.05)

-.08
(.05)

-.18
(.08)**

-.18
(.09)**

Probability of ProGovernment Outcome at
X-Bar

.68

.68

.71

.68

Total Observations

850

341

304

106

Corporate
Tax Cases
Post-WWII
(4)

Note: Results marked *** are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, ** are
statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and * are statistically significant at the 0.10
level. Errors are clustered by Chief Justice. All models include controls for judicial
political preferences, the economy, defense spending, the identity of the petitioning
party, and a time trend.180
178

See infra notes 232–42 and accompanying text.
For a useful discussion of statistical significance and its interpretation for empirical
results, see WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 174, at 133–38.
180 For purposes of fitting the models, we included cases that involved only one legal
issue in order to avoid any possible confounding. For readers interested in the pseudo Rsquared, these findings are as follows for models 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively: .03, .04, .03, .13.
179
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Our statistical methods enable us to predict whether an allegation
of corporate tax abuse will improve or detract from the government’s
case on average, but we can also use the models to predict the likelihood that the government will prevail in specific cases.181 For
example, conditional on the factors for which we have controlled in
the model presented in column (4) of Table 2, we predict that the
government had a 75% chance of winning in Corn Products v.
Commissioner (the government won),182 a 48% chance of winning in
Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner (the government lost),183 and
a 45% chance of winning in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United
States (the government lost).184 This small sampling of results suggests
that our initial models perform very well. Given that we know the
outcome of every case in our database, we can investigate our model’s
performance in detail and we do so below.185 For now we simply note
that our models predict that the government has a substantially lower
likelihood of prevailing in corporate tax abuse cases than in any other
type of tax case litigated in the Supreme Court.
The results presented in Table 2 indicate that the government is,
on average, 7% to 8% less likely to prevail in corporate tax abuse
cases. This estimate increases to 18% in the post–World War II
period. Figure 3 below presents the results with respect to the distribution of probabilities over the course of the last century. The graph on
the left in Figure 3 presents all taxation cases versus corporate tax
abuse cases, and the graph on the right presents only corporate tax
cases versus corporate tax abuse cases. The y-axis in both figures is the
average predicted probability of a pro-government outcome in the
cases decided each year. The x-axis is the year in which the case was
decided. The solid line in both graphs depicts cases without an allegation of corporate tax abuse and the dashed line indicates that the government alleged corporate tax abuse. Note that in both graphs the
solid line is above the dashed line, indicating a higher predicted
probability of government success in the cases in which abuse was not
a litigated issue.186

181 To generate the model’s predictions with respect to individual cases, we used the
“predict” syntax in STATA. See STATA CORP., supra note 175 at 445–48.
182 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
183 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
184 532 U.S. 822 (2001).
185 See infra Part II.C (examining the model’s performance and success).
186 We generated these graphs with the help of the “graph twoway lowess” syntax in
STATA. See STATA, GRAPHICS 217–19 (2005).
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FIGURE 3
PROBABILITY OF A PRO-GOVERNMENT OUTCOME IN
CORPORATE TAX ABUSE AND NON-CORPORATE
TAX ABUSE CASES

Note: The graph on the left depicts the probability of a pro-government outcome in
the superset of all federal taxation cases. The graph on the right depicts the subset
of corporate tax cases. Both graphs disaggregate the cases based on whether the
government alleged corporate tax abuse. The graphs present the predicted
probability of a pro-government outcome using a Locally Weighted Scatterplot
Smoothing (Lowess) curve. Note that in both graphs, our models predict a lower
probability of a pro-government outcome if abuse is alleged.

Although corporate tax abuse cases are more difficult for the
government to win than other types of cases, it is useful to note that,
aside from a few exceptional years, the government has had a greater
than 50% chance of winning. In fact, on average, the government prevailed in 61% of all the corporate tax abuse cases it litigated since
1909. This suggests that while the government may have a weaker case
in corporate abuse controversies compared to other types of tax controversies, nevertheless it is likely to prevail if the dispute reaches the
Supreme Court. Thus, while a corporate taxpayer’s chance of prevailing increases in the abuse cases, corporations always seem to be at
a disadvantage.187
Our data, however, indicate that the government’s win rate in tax
cases was at an all-time high in the 1950s and began to decline after
that time. Note that in Figure 3, the drop-off occurred simultaneously
in all the tax cases litigated, cases in which abuse was alleged and also
when it was not alleged. This is an important development because
187 Numerous studies have investigated the government’s chances of success and argue
that, as a repeat player, it enjoys advantages that other litigants lack. See, e.g., Cohen &
Spitzer, supra note 164, at 395 (arguing that government litigators influence the set of cases
from which the Supreme Court can choose, tilting administrative common law in a progovernment direction); Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role
of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187, 189–93 (1995) (pointing to the
government’s well-established advantage based on both status and the tendency of its lawyers to be repeat players).
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scholars have argued that the makeup of the Court, in particular the
appointment of Justice Scalia, may have caused the observed protaxpayer turn in judicial outcomes.188 This claim may have merit, but
the data unambiguously indicate that other factors were also at work.
2.

What Explains Supreme Court Decisions in the Corporate Tax
Abuse Cases?

We now move from comparisons between abuse and non-abuse
controversies and focus solely on the abuse cases, hoping to illuminate
the judicial decisionmaking process in this specific context. We use
model (3) described above189 to determine which factors enhance and
which factors undermine the government’s chances of winning the
abuse cases. Table 3, below, presents our empirical findings. For discussion purposes, we begin by focusing on the transaction-related
variables associated with corporate tax abuse. We then turn to the
cases involving accounting irregularities and refund claims. Next we
examine Justice Scalia’s role in the decisionmaking process. Finally,
we discuss the five control variables and their effects on Supreme
Court outcomes. We conclude with a summary of our findings and an
analysis of how well our models performed compared with the actual
outcomes in the cases that we analyzed.

188
189

See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.3.
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CORPORATE

U.S. Supreme Court Outcomes
Results depict change in the probability of a pro-government outcome given a unit
increase in the independent variable
Explanatory Variable

Corporate Tax Abuse Cases
(1)
(2)
(3)

Third Party Involved

-.21
(.05)***

-.36
(.13)***

Multistep Transaction

-.03
(.08)

-.35
(.09)***

Lack of Business Purpose

.07
(.07)

.29
(.15)

Count (Total Number of Allegations)

-.06
(.04)

Third Party & Multistep

.50
(.07)***

Third Party & Lack of Business Purpose

-.22
(.19)

Multistep & Lack of Business Purpose

-.26
(.26)

Accounting Irregularity
Taxpayer Claimed Refund
Justice Scalia on Court
Defense Spending
(in $10 billions)

.18
(.09)*

.22
(.08)**

.15
(.10)

.28
(.09)***

.24
(.09)**

.22
(.06)***

-.05
(.15)

-.09
(.18)

-.01
(.13)

.004
.003
(.001)*** (.001)**

.003
(.001)**

Government Is Petitioner

.11
(.08)

.13
(.07)*

.14
(.08)

Supreme Court Controlled by Republicans

.05
(.13)

.02
(.13)

.06
(.12)

Business Cycle
(growing economy)

-.13
(.10)

-.13
(.08)

-.11
(.10)

-.004
(.002)**

-.002
(.002)

-.006
(.002)

Probability of Pro-Government Outcome at X-Bar

.63

.63

.64

Total Observations

123

123

123

Time Trend

Note: Results marked *** are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, ** are statistically
significant at the 0.05 level, and * are statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Errors are
clustered by Chief Justice. To avoid any possible confounding, we included cases with
only one legal issue in our modeling process.190
190 For readers interested in the pseudo R-squared, these findings are as follows for
model 1, 2, and 3, respectively: 0.13, 0.11, and 0.18.
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Transaction-Related Factors

Recall from the discussion above that the legal briefs filed with
the Supreme Court indicate that the government continually points to
three transaction-related indicia of abuse when litigating cases
involving alleged abusive transactions: (1) the presence of a third
party; (2) multistep transactions; and (3) the lack of a non-tax business
purpose.191 Column (1) in Table 3 presents somewhat surprising
results vis-à-vis these variables. We found that the presence of third
parties and multistep transactions decrease the probability that the
government will win in the Supreme Court by 21% and 3%, respectively, although only the finding on third parties is statistically significant—thus it is the only finding in which we can have confidence.
With respect to the lack of a business purpose, the government is 7%
more likely to prevail when it alleges this factor. But, this finding is
not statistically significant and provides weak evidence against the null
hypothesis that this variable is playing no role in the decisionmaking
process.192 These findings suggest that the facts and circumstances
widely believed to strongly and positively correlate with corporate tax
abuse are simply not very convincing to the Court. Only one finding
achieves significance—the presence of third parties. While this fact
may look suspicious to government litigators, it appears that the
Justices disagree. Perhaps the Justices believe that the presence of an
outside party indicates an arm’s-length transaction that should be
respected and not disregarded, as advocated by the government.
These results are not what we expected, yet they may suggest what
many tax scholars and commentators have argued for years: Courts
are unpredictable when it comes to corporate tax abuse
controversies.193
The results presented in column (1) of Table 3 depict the effects
of each of these three case-related factors separately, but what if the
government alleges two or more factors simultaneously? Perhaps the
Court is more likely to unwind an otherwise legal corporate tax
strategy when the government musters a strong case with numerous
indicia of abuse. To test this hypothesis, we created a count variable
that represents the number of factors alleged. It is coded as equal to 0,
1, 2, or 3, indicating the number of these factors alleged concurrently
in each case. Column (2) of Table 3 presents our findings with respect
to the count variable and indicates that the presence of more than one
191

See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing factors to which the government points in its briefs).
For a useful discussion of statistical significance and its interpretation for empirical
results, see WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 174, at 133–38.
193 See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining the Court’s variation).
192
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abuse factor actually decreases the probability that the Court will side
with the government, although this finding is not statistically significant. The results associated with the count variable indicate that, as
the number of transaction-related allegations increase, the probability
of a pro-government outcome decreases by 6%. This finding suggests
that even if the government believes certain factors indicate abuse,
pointing to an increasing number of the factors is not a winning
strategy. Again the model implies support for critics of judicial decisionmaking in the abuse context: The outcomes are unpredictable and
perhaps counterintuitive.194 Stated most directly: Why does the taxpayer’s case get stronger as the government points to more indicia of
abuse? We expected that the taxpayer’s case would weaken in these
circumstances, but we were wrong.195
To further probe the effects of the transaction-related variables,
we examined specific combinations of the factors on the theory that
while the Court is not convinced by an increasing number (or count)
of allegations, the Justices may be persuaded by specific combinations
or groupings. Perhaps specific combinations of factors may serve as
convincing evidence of abuse, whereas factors cited alone or factors
randomly grouped together may not have the same probative value.
Accordingly, we investigated cases in which the government alleged
the following combinations: (1) third parties and multistep transactions; (2) third parties and the lack of business purpose; and (3) multistep transactions and the lack of business purpose.196 Column (3) of
Table 3 presents our findings and suggests that the precise blend of
factors is important to the decisionmaking process.
To understand the results presented in column (3) of Table 3, first
note that the column reports empirical findings for each variable separately and then in the three unique combinations. The three variables
listed separately indicate the effects of the variable when it is alleged
and when the others are not alleged. Thus, we see that when the government only alleges the presence of a third party, it is 36% less likely
to win; when it alleges only a multistep transaction it is 35% less likely
to win; when it alleges only the lack of a business purpose it is 29%
more likely to win. The first two factors, standing alone, hurt the government at statistically significant levels, but when the government

194

See id.
See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining our models and hypotheses).
196 We were unable to examine all three variables simultaneously due to the small
number of cases in our dataset.
195
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alleges only the lack of a business purpose the finding is not statistically significant and thus we cannot have confidence in the finding.197
Now consider the three unique combinations of the variables
(known as “interaction effects”),198 presented in column (3) of Table
3. While the interpretation of these terms is somewhat more complex
than the other terms in the model,199 we begin by noting that the
results presented indicate the following: When third parties and multistep transactions are alleged together, the government is 50% more
likely to win. This combination convinces the Court, at the highest,
0.01 statistically significant level, that the corporation engaged in a
transaction that the judiciary should not support.200 The other two
combinations, by contrast, do not exert the same positive effect on the
Court. When third parties and a lack of business purpose are combined in the government’s argument, the government is 22% less
likely to prevail. When the government alleges multistep transactions
and a lack of business purpose it is 26% less likely to prevail—though
neither of these two findings is statistically significant. The government’s actual win rate confirms these findings: The government prevailed in 60% of the cases that involved third parties and multistep
transactions; it prevailed in 50% of the cases involving third parties
and an alleged lack of a business purpose; and it prevailed in just 45%
of the cases that involved multistep transactions and the alleged lack
of a business purpose.
The results, however, are somewhat more nuanced than we have
just suggested. Interaction terms in this type of statistical model may
have different effects for different cases, so the “average effects” associated with the interaction terms may not be an accurate predictor of
results.201 To understand fully the effects of a government litigation
strategy that combines two transaction-related factors, we should

197 See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 174, at 133–38 (discussing statistical significance and
its interpretation for empirical results).
198 See id. at 197–99.
199 See Edward C. Norton, Hua Wang & Chunrong Ai, Computing Interaction Effects
and Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models, 4 STATA J. 154, 154–67 (2004) (arguing
that most applied researchers misinterpret the coefficients on interaction terms and proposing useful interpretive procedures); see also William Greene, Testing Hypotheses About
Interaction Terms in Nonlinear Models, 107 ECON. LETTERS 291, 291 (2010) (arguing that
graphical presentations are the most effective means for presenting the results).
200 Familiar cases such as Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958), and other
less known cases such as John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), and Handy
& Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931), confirm our statistical finding: These factors
work to the distinct advantage of the government.
201 See Norton et al., supra note 199, at 154.
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consider the effect on various cases by taking into consideration the
overall probability that the government will prevail.202
Consider Figure 4.203 The y-axis indicates whether the twopronged argument helps or hurts the government’s case. The x-axis
depicts these results based on the overall probability of a government
win, conditional on all the variables in the model. Note that when the
government alleges both third parties and multistep transactions, its
likelihood of winning is always well above zero, though the effect
begins to decline as the probability of winning approaches 80%. This
suggests that when the government has a strong case, based on other
factors discussed above, these transaction-related variables have a
positive effect, but the effect is decreasing in overall strength. Stated
most directly, the model indicates that when the government’s case is
otherwise weak, alleging these transaction-related variables will
increase the probability of a pro-government decision by more than
40%. But when the government’s case is strong based on other factors, the probability of a pro-government outcome is increased by less
than 20% with these allegations.
Note that the other two combinations, a lack of business purpose
combined with third parties and a lack of business purpose combined
with multistep transactions, exert a negative effect on the government’s case. The effect is always negative but approaches zero, suggesting no effect as the probability of a government win moves closer
and closer to 100%. These findings indicate that when the government
has a weak case, the transaction-related variables play a stronger role
in the decisionmaking process. But, as the government’s case
improves (due to the factors we discussed above), the transactionrelated variables have a minor effect on the Justice’s decisions.

202

See id.
We generated these graphs with the help of the “graph twoway lowess” syntax in
STATA. See STATA, GRAPHICS 217–19 (2005) (discussing graphics technology).
203
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FIGURE 4
GOVERNMENT STRATEGY OF COMBINING MULTIPLE
FACTORS CAN HELP and Hurt Its Case

Note: The y-axis indicates whether government arguments that combine transactionrelated variables help or hurt the case. The x-axis indicates the probability of a progovernment outcome conditional on all the variables in the model presented in Table 3,
column (3).

We believe that the best model of judicial decisionmaking is
presented in column (3) of Table 3 because it accounts for a range of
realistic government litigation strategies.204 As we will discuss in
greater depth in Part III, corporate lawyers who advise clients on the
tax consequences of their deals and government litigators who subsequently challenge a deal in court can use these findings strategically.
First, we can see that a single indicator of abuse does not convince the
Court that the Justices should deny the corporation its preferred tax
outcome. The government appears to be more effective when it
alleges multiple indicia of abuse—but only if certain combinations are
present, not simply an increasing number of allegations as indicated
204 We believe the model avoids any possible omitted variable bias. See WOOLDRIDGE,
supra note 174, at 84–94, 133–40 (discussing the omitted variable bias in general terms). It
also has the highest pseudo R-squared, although we do not put too much weight on this
measure. Id. at 199–200, 580–84 (noting that R-squared is an estimate of how much variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables, and the pseudo
R-squared is used for the probit models).

\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\87-6\nyu601.txt

1690

unknown

Seq: 50

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6-DEC-12

8:29

[Vol. 87:1641

by the results associated with the count variable.205 Specifically, the
government should point to third parties and multistep transactions
—two objective fact-based allegations—in order to increase its
chances of winning. But third parties combined with a lack of business
purpose, or a multistep transaction combined with a lack of business
purpose—one fact-based allegation and the other a matter of opinion
—is not a winning combination and together operate to decrease the
likelihood that the Court will find in favor of the government. These
findings, all taken together, suggest that the presence of the thirdparties and multistep transactions in general make the government’s
case substantially weaker with one exception: when they are present
together in a transaction that the government believes to be abusive.
Finally, the results presented in Table 3 above indicate that the business purpose test is not playing a strong role in the Court’s decisionmaking process. Indeed, it appears to play little or no role when
standing alone and a negative role when combined with other
factors.206
b.

Tax Return Factors: Accounting Irregularities and Refund
Claims

We now turn to the items on the corporate tax return that raise a
red flag of abuse in the government’s view. We begin with accounting
irregularities, such as an asymmetry in the amount of income reported
on corporate financial accounting documents and on the corporate tax
return filed with the IRS.207 Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 3 indicate that when the government points to an accounting irregularity in
its legal brief filed in Court, it is 15% to 22% more likely to prevail.
This finding is statistically significant in two of the three models, suggesting that accounting irregularities increase the chances that the
Justices will find that the corporation sought an inappropriate tax
advantage. The raw numbers in our database confirm this finding: The
government prevailed in 80% of the cases in which it pointed to
accounting irregularities. 208
We now turn to the loss transactions that a corporation might use
to claim a refund on its tax return filed with the IRS, where the IRS
205

See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text.
Many scholars have examined and critiqued the business purpose test as being difficult to apply objectively and thus not particularly useful for judicial decisionmaking. See
supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
207 For discussion of this variable, see supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
208 Cases such as Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960), Hertz Corp. v.
United States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960), and United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S.
593 (1986), all suggest that when the government attacks inventive tax reporting strategies
it is likely to win in the Supreme Court.
206
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subsequently denied the corporation’s claim. As noted above,
corporate refund claims signal to the government that the taxpayer
may have participated in an abusive transaction in order to generate a
tax loss.209 All three models presented in Table 3, above, indicate that
when the corporate taxpayer seeks a refund and when the IRS denies
the refund claim, the government’s chances of winning increase by
34% to 42% at highly statistically significant levels.210 When
numerous models produce consistent and significant findings, the
results can be interpreted as robust and strongly probative of the variable’s effects on the outcome of interest. Our findings suggest that
when corporate taxpayers seek the Court’s assistance in extracting
money from the Treasury in a refund claim, the Justices are much
more likely to find the transaction abusive than in cases in which the
corporation simply seeks to pay less tax than the government deems
owed. In terms of raw numbers, the government prevailed in 77% of
the cases that involved such a refund denial. This win rate increases to
84% when the refund denial includes allegations of abuse.
Figure 5 below presents two graphs that visually display the findings in Table 3 with respect to accounting irregularities and refund
claims. The y-axis in both graphs indicates the predicted probability of
a pro-government outcome based on the model presented in column
(3) in Table 3, and the x-axis is the year in which the case was decided.
The graph on the left indicates that, while alleged accounting irregularities were not a winning argument early on, by the mid-1930s this
argument increased the probability that the government would prevail. The graph on the right indicates that when a corporate taxpayer
seeks a refund, which the IRS subsequently denies, its chances of winning substantially decrease.

209 See supra text accompanying notes 101–02 (describing large tax losses as a possible
signal of abuse).
210 To be clear, this factor refers to instances when the taxpayer requested a refund on
its initial return or in a separate return. It does not refer to situations when the taxpayer
sought to recover an amount that it paid following the finding of a deficiency by the IRS
during an audit of the taxpayer’s return.
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FIGURE 5
ACCOUNTING DISCREPANCIES AND CORPORATE REFUND
CLAIMS INCREASE THE GOVERNMENT’S
CHANCES OF WINNING IN COURT

Note: The y-axis indicates predicted probability of a pro-government outcome and the xaxis is the term in which the cases are argued.

c.

Personnel Factor: Justice Scalia

As we have discussed, several scholars have suggested that Justice
Scalia’s appointment led to an increase in judicial deference to the
text of the tax statute, a literalist approach that often underlies taxpayers’ arguments in corporate tax abuse cases.211 Our models indicate that a corporation’s chance of winning increased between 1% and
9% in the post-1986 era. The negative sign on Justice Scalia’s coefficient in all three models presented in Table 3 indicates that Justice
Scalia may have had an effect on the government’s win rate, but the
results never achieve statistical significance. The empirical findings
presented in Table 3 are presented graphically in Figure 6, below.

211 See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text (explaining a potential Justice Scalia
effect).
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FIGURE 6
JUSTICE SCALIA’S APPOINTMENT AND CORPORATE TAX
ABUSE CASE OUTCOMES

Note: The y-axis indicates predicted probability of a pro-government outcome and the xaxis is the term in which the cases are argued.

We cannot confidently conclude that Justice Scalia and the plain
meaning approach to statutory interpretation has had the predicted
impact for a few important reasons. First, the results are not statistically significant. Second, our dataset includes only a small number of
judicial opinions—nine—in the time period under investigation.
Third, and perhaps most problematic to the theory highlighting Justice
Scalia’s role in tax abuse cases, Figure 6 indicates that the government’s probability of winning began to decline well before Scalia’s
appointment, casting further doubt on the Scalia theory. Finally, the
appointment of Justice Scalia in 1986 occurred during the same period
as other significant developments in the federal tax law, namely the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,212 which may have had an
effect on the Justices’ interpretation of tax avoidance strategies. It
bears noting, however, that although the Supreme Court appears to
have taken a pro-taxpayer turn in the late 1950s, the government’s
212 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
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probability of winning consistently exceeds the taxpayer’s probability
of winning.
d.

The Control Variables

We have focused thus far on the variables in our model that
directly relate to the corporate transaction, the tax return, and a specific Supreme Court Justice—all discussed and debated by tax scholars
and tax commentators in the existing literature.213 We now turn to the
set of control variables that commentators, with just a few exceptions,
have largely ignored214—but that we believe exert influence on the
Court’s decisionmaking process. For this discussion, we focus on Table
3. We note, as a preliminary matter, that the three models presented
in the table produce consistent results across all the control variables,
indicating that our findings are robust to different model specifications and giving us confidence in our results.
We begin by reviewing defense spending effects. We find that
every $10 billion increase (measured in 2009 dollars) in national
defense spending leads to a 0.3% to 0.4% increase in the likelihood of
a pro-government outcome at highly statistically significant levels.215
At first cut, this finding may not appear substantively interesting given
the small size of the coefficient, but consider the magnitude of the
defense spending spikes that have occurred over time. During World
War I, World War II, the Vietnam War, and President Reagan’s defense build-up in the 1980s, for example, defense spending increased
by $70 billion, $97 billion, $10 billion, and $17 billion, respectively.216
These increases, in turn, correspond to an expected increase in the
government win rate by at least 21%, 29%, 3%, and 5% respectively,
and possibly substantially more. The government’s chance of winning
increases at notable levels during times of war and foreign policy
crises.
With respect to our second control, whether the government is
the petitioner or the respondent in the Supreme Court, we find that
when the government is the petitioner, the likelihood of a progovernment outcome increases by 11% to 14%. However, this finding is statistically significant in only one of our three models. This
213

See supra Part I.B.3 (reviewing scholarly literature on corporate tax abuse).
See id.
215 See STAUDT, supra note 163, at 2 (also finding strong evidence against the null
hypothesis that defense spending has no effect on Supreme Court outcomes).
216 For a detailed discussion of historical defense spending trends, see OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013 HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
7–10 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-TAB/pdf/
BUDGET-2013-TAB.pdf.
214
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substantive result is consistent with a large body of literature that has
theorized and found empirically that the Court is more likely to
reverse a lower court decision than uphold it, thus boosting the petitioning party’s chances after the Justices grant the petition for
certiorari.217
Our last three controls do not produce statistically significant
results in any of the three models, and thus we cannot have confidence
that they reflect the true effects. Nonetheless, we have “best guesses”
based on our modeling efforts: When a majority of the Justices on the
Court are appointed by Republicans, the Court is 2% to 5% more
likely to rule in favor the government; when the economy is booming,
the government is 11% to 13% less likely to win; and our time trend
indicates that the government’s win rate has decreased in the more
recent era.
C.

Model Evaluation: Its Successes and Its Limitations

We now examine how well our model predicts the Supreme
Court’s decisions that we actually observe over the course of the last
century. We are able to assess our model’s performance because it
generates the probability that the government will win in each case,
conditional on our set of independent variables (that is, the variables
listed on the right side of equations (1), (2), and (3) above). 218 Consider, for example, two well-known cases involving corporate taxpayer
attempts to avoid tax costs associated with selling property directly to
a third party, United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co. 219 and
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,220 which we discussed earlier. 221
In both cases, the corporation sought to avoid corporate-level taxation by distributing the designated property to shareholders, who then
sold the property to an outside third party.222 In both cases, the government took the position that the corporations used the tax law in a
manner that would undermine its revenue-raising purpose.223 Using
the model presented in column (3) of Table 3, we find that the government had a 28% chance of prevailing in Cumberland (the government
217 See, e.g., Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 164, at 409 (pointing to the overall tendency of
the Supreme Court to reverse the circuit courts).
218 See supra Part II.A.3.
219 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
220 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
221 See supra notes 55–62.
222 Cumberland, 338 U.S. at 452; Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 332.
223 Brief for the United States at 17–18, United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co.,
338 U.S. 451 (1950) (No. 214) (arguing that transaction was set up simply to avoid taxes);
Brief for Petitioner at 10, Comm’r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (No. 581)
(same).
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lost) and a 62% chance of winning in Court Holding (the government
won). We are able to examine the probability of a government win in
every case and compare this prediction to the true outcome generated
by the Court. Readers interested in the list of abuse cases included in
our study should consult the Appendix.
In addition to examining individual cases, we can examine the
model’s performance in more general terms. With respect to our 137
corporate abuse cases, our model predicted that the government had a
greater than 50% chance of winning 92 of these cases, and a less than
a 50% chance of prevailing in the remaining 45 cases. In short, the
model predicted that the government was more likely than not to prevail in 67% of the cases, or 92 out of 137—in reality, the government
won 65%, or 89 of 137. These preliminary numbers suggest the model
performed well, though far from perfectly. For example, the lowest
probability of a government win was 11%, for the case United States v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., a case the government actually won.224
The highest probability was 99%, generated for Hertz Corp. v. United
States, which the government also won.225 Table 4 disaggregates the
data and presents the predictions and observed outcomes along an
inter-quartile continuum. The first column indicates the predicted
probabilities from our statistical model for each quartile, the second
column indicates the number of cases that fell within that quartile, and
the third column indicates the percentage of cases that were decided
in favor of the government. Of course, as the predicted probability
increases in the first column, the percentage of actual wins should also
increase in the third column. A brief look at the two columns indicates
that our model performed well: As the model predicted an increased
likelihood that the government would prevail in the Supreme Court,
the government in fact won more cases.
PREDICTED

TABLE 4
OBSERVED OUTCOMES
INVOLVING ALLEGED ABUSE
VERSUS

Model Prediction as to the
Likelihood That the Government
Will Win

IN

CASES

Number of
Corporate Tax
Abuse Cases

Observed Percentage of
Cases in Which the
Government Won

Predicted Probability < 25%
25% < Predicted Probability < 50%
50% < Predicted Probability < 75%
Predicted Probability > 75%

6
39
45
47

16%
33%
76%
87%

Total Observations

137

100%

224
225

493 U.S. 132, 138 (1989).
364 U.S. 122, 125–26 (1960).
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Our analysis indicates that our model offers useful predictions
with respect to Supreme Court decisionmaking in corporate tax abuse
cases. But the model also suffers from various limitations that are
important to note.226
First and most importantly, our dataset may suffer from a selection problem. That is, litigants (either the government or the taxpayer) may choose to appeal a distinctive set of cases to the Supreme
Court, thereby biasing our dataset and potentially leading to spurious
empirical results.227 To understand this problem, consider the possibility that the government does not appeal cases that involve allegedly
abusive transactions when they have a strong business purpose on the
theory that it will lose in the Supreme Court. If the government in fact
selects cases to appeal on the strength of the business purpose, then
our finding that the business purpose factor is not playing the
expected role in the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process should
not be surprising—after all, the cases with strong arguments have
been selected out of the process.228 Of course, this potential problem
is offset by the counter-strategy that taxpayers will adopt: They will
appeal cases that have factors that work in their favor. In fact, we
expect cases that have strong arguments in one direction or another
likely are settled before they reach the Supreme Court, leaving only
the collection of cases that have strong arguments in both directions.229 Moreover, we have conducted preliminary studies of the
selection issue and have found that if the problem exists, it operates to
confirm and not undermine our findings.230 Although we plan to further investigate judicial decisionmaking in the context of corporate tax
226 Advantages and disadvantages exist in all empirical research. See, e.g., Roger J.
Gagnon, Empirical Research: The Burdens and the Benefits, 12 INTERFACES 98 (1982)
(explaining the advantages and disadvantages of empirical research in a business context);
The Promise and Limitations of an Empirical Approach to Law, VA. J., no. 11, 2008, at 29,
29–35 (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of empirical research in the legal
context).
227 For a useful discussion of sample selection problems, see WOOLDRIDGE, supra note
174, at 174.
228 We thank Professor Ted P. Seto for pointing out this particular example of a selection bias problem.
229 A large existing literature explores the selection problem both inside and outside of
the taxation context. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes
in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989) (discussing selection problems
from Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and prisoner cases); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go
to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
315 (1999) (discussing selection problems among Tax Court cases); George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)
(exploring selection problems generally).
230 See STAUDT, supra note 163, at 89, 96 (using the Heckman selection model to empirically investigate the selection effects operating in tax cases in the Supreme Court).
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abuse in the future, we believe that our study is useful for understanding and explaining the outcomes in the cases that actually reach
the Supreme Court, irrespective of the strategies that underlie litigants’ decisions to appeal.231
Second, even if our study is free of selection bias, we have
focused on Supreme Court decisionmaking over the course of the last
century. Our findings therefore reflect statistical effects averaged over
the course of many years. This raises the question: Are the decisions
and outcomes rendered in the mid-1900s and earlier relevant for
understanding the contemporary Supreme Court? To begin, we note
that we examined abuse cases over such a long period in order to
obtain a sufficient number of observations to fit the data to the
models.232 This technical explanation, of course, leaves the substantive
question unanswered. Thus, we conducted a qualitative investigation
of the early Court opinions to understand and explain how the docket,
arguments, and legal analyses have changed over time. As we discuss
below, to our surprise, we found high levels of consistency over the
different eras.
We found that while the specific details of the transactions and
tax positions have changed over the years, the government has consistently looked to the same five factors when identifying abuse. It has
pointed to the presence of third parties in cases decided as early as
1913 and as late as 1991; to multistep transactions in cases decided as
early as 1925 and as late as 1991; to the lack of a business purpose
from 1920 through 1991; to accounting irregularities from 1925
through 2011; and to inappropriate refund requests from 1927 through
1991. These findings indicate that the taxpayers have altered the
details of their avoidance strategies over the course of the last century,
but they have also continually incorporated the same general attributes that have served as signals of abuse since 1913.233
We also examined the Supreme Court’s opinions for purposes of
understanding the transformations in precedent and legal analyses.
This was necessary because even if the signals of abuse have remained
constant, if the Court has updated and transformed its view of the five
factors, then the early opinions may have very little relevance for
understanding today’s decisionmaking process. Our qualitative
231

We thank Professor Leandra Lederman for emphasizing this point.
We identified 137 tax abuse cases using the methodology described above. See supra
Parts II.A.1–2. The Supreme Court decided ninety-three of these cases prior to 1950,
leaving only forty-four to analyze with our models in the post-1950 era. When we
attempted to do this with STATA, we found the model dropped numerous variables and
produced unintelligible results.
233 See, e.g., supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
232
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investigation, however, indicates that early judicial opinions continue
to affect later Courts. Consider United States v. Hughes Properties,
Inc., a 1986 case that involved accounting irregularities.234 The
majority opinion cited to abuse cases decided in 1926, 1930, and 1961
in order to identify the fundamental principles of tax accounting.235 In
United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, a 2001 case in which
the government argued that the taxpayer took a tax position that rose
to the level of abuse,236 the Court also considered early cases such as
Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose (decided in 1932)237 and Libson Shops,
Inc. v. Koehler (decided in 1957).238 Indeed, one of the cases included
in our study, North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet,239 decided
in 1932, has been cited over one hundred times in the post–World War
II era, including in numerous Supreme Court corporate tax abuse
cases.240 The seventy-six judicial opinions addressing corporate tax
abuse and issued between the years 1909 and 1945 have generated
9863 citations—and more than half of these citations occur in the
post–World War II era. Our qualitative analysis, in short, leads us to
conclude that the corporate tax abuse opinions do not become antiquated, but rather serve as useful precedent for generations. Professor
James Eustice noted that modern corporate tax abuse is “packaged in
new and exotic wrappers,”241 but its basic elements are “still the same
old, same old thing.”242 We would add that the cases also require the
same old jurisprudential considerations.
The third and final limitation is whether our empirical findings
with respect to the Supreme Court are generalizable to lower courts.
This question is particularly important because most corporate tax
abuse litigation ends with a lower federal court opinion. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court’s decisions govern in all lower courts, and
for this reason we believe that the factors that persuade the Supreme
234

476 U.S. 593, 595 (1986).
The Court, for example, cited to United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926);
Lucas v. Kansas City Structural Steel, 281 U.S. 264, 269 (1930), and also noted United States
v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 366 U.S. 380, 385 (1961). Hughes Properties, 476
U.S. at 600, 603 (1986).
236 532 U.S. 822, 837 (2001).
237 Id. at 840, 842 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S.
319, 328, 330 (1932)).
238 United Dominion, 532 U.S. at 825 (citing Lisbon Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382,
386 (1957)).
239 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
240 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 209 (1990); Am.
Auto. Ass’n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 700 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
241 James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55
TAX L. REV. 135, 172 (2002).
242 Id.
235
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Court likely have an effect on lower federal court judges.243 On the
other hand, we are mindful of the fact that lower federal courts may
face an entirely different collection of cases and thus weigh factors
very differently.244 As a result, we believe it is important to extend our
study to the lower federal courts in order to determine several questions left unanswered, including the following three: (1) How do the
lower courts (both appellate and trial) weigh the collection of factors
that we found to affect the Supreme Court? (2) Do lower courts consider different factors in the judicial decisionmaking process? (3) Do
the Tax Court and federal district court judges weight factors differently in the judicial decisionmaking process?245

IMPLICATIONS

III
FUTURE RESEARCH

AND

This study explores patterns of the Supreme Court’s approach to
corporate tax abuse over a time period spanning more than a century.
The findings may have implications for a variety of different parties,
including private practitioners who design corporate tax strategies,
IRS agents who audit corporations, government and private lawyers
who litigate corporate tax abuse cases, and policymakers and scholars
who study the judiciary’s role in controlling corporate tax abuse.246
In this Part, we present the questions raised by our study and the
potential implications of our findings. But before we do so, we would
like to comment briefly on the role of statistics in the everyday practice of law. Many lawyers believe their own expertise and knowledge
is sufficient when advising clients and litigating cases. Some believe
that empirical studies are interesting, but not altogether relevant to
243 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best)
Supreme Court Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 501 (2010) (discussing the influence of the Supreme Court opinions, and Justice Scalia opinions in particular, on other
courts).
244 Scholars have discussed different influences on lower courts as compared to the
Supreme Court. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE
L.J. 2155, 2158–59 (1998) (discussing five reasons for lower courts to comply with or disobey the Supreme Court); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612
(2004) (exploring factors that affect district and circuit court decisions in taxpayer standing
cases).
245 These are just three of the questions that we plan to address in future analyses of the
decisions of the federal appellate and trial courts, as we develop a more comprehensive
theory that explains the judicial decisionmaking process in corporate tax abuse cases. In
our next studies, we first plan to analyze a sample of the corporate tax abuse decisions of
the federal appellate courts and then plan to analyze decisions of the U.S. District Courts,
the U.S. Tax Court, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
246 These are the interested parties we discussed above. See supra Part I.B.
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the actual practice of law.247 We agree that knowledge and expertise
are necessary to achieve legal success, but we are not convinced that
they are always sufficient. That is to say, general trends identified with
the help of data and statistics, such as those presented in our study,
can provide useful information that should supplement and refine the
insights provided by individual lawyers.248 Put differently, we believe
lawyers are not so different from other professionals, such as those in
the health care industry. Most individuals, for example, prefer a
doctor who is up-to-date on the latest studies and uses of drugs, yet
also desire to be treated by a doctor who understands the unique
attributes and concerns of an individual patient. We believe that the
qualitative information and knowledge acquired through hard work
and experience is essential to success in most professions, but systematically and completely ignoring scientific findings is not a strategy
that best serves clients’ interests.
A.

Can Parties Exploit Our Findings?

Our study identifies a range of factors that both hurt and help the
government’s case in the Supreme Court, and for this reason it may be
helpful to lawyers engaging in corporate transactional work and to
litigators defending corporations following an audit. We first note that
the variables that we analyzed, such as the allegation of a lack of nontax business purpose, the use of multiple transaction steps, or
accounting irregularities, have played a significant role in corporate
tax abuse controversies for generations.249 These factors will likely
247 We thank Michael J. Desmond for making this point. Mr. Desmond presented excellent comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
248 See Theodore Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1150, 1183, 1188–89 (2004) (demonstrating that in some circumstances, scientific
models can and do outperform individual experts when it comes to predicting Supreme
Court behavior). For an example of practicing lawyers’ use of data and statistics, see John
S. Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure of Understanding of U.S.
Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S.L.W. 393, 394 (2011). See
also John S. Summers & Michael J. Newman, ‘Matrixx,’ Materiality and Statistical
Significance, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 28, 2011 (discussing the role of the “statistical
significance” test in judicial decisionmaking). John Summers and Michael Newman are
conducting a large empirical study of Supreme Court decisionmaking and its review of the
thirteen courts of appeals. See Supreme Court Project, HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL
PUDLIN & SCHILLER, http://www.hangley.com/Supreme_Court_Project/ (last visited Aug.
19, 2012). For a fun investigation into the role of statistics in a profession long perceived to
rely on individual expertise and knowledge, see MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART
OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004), profiling a sabermetric approach to recruiting baseball players.
249 See Eustice, supra note 241, at 136 (describing the tax shelter boom of the late 1990s
as “not a new” problem).
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continue to influence the government’s decision to challenge corporate tax strategies as abusive.250 Consequently, our results may enable
tax lawyers to develop strategies that account for how judges identify
corporate tax abuse, a concept historically considered nebulous at best
and unknowable at worst.251 In short, notwithstanding the fact that
our study is limited to cases that appeared before the Supreme Court,
this new understanding of how the Justices respond to corporate tax
abuse allegations can serve important practical purposes.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations
on the potential application of our findings for corporate tax transactional work. Specifically, we concede that most tax lawyers will not
incorporate certain findings regarding external factors into their planning analysis. For example, our study indicates that an increase in
defense spending has a statistically significant effect on the government’s likelihood of winning a corporate tax abuse case.252 Not only
are most lawyers likely unaware of the relative levels of government
spending on national defense (though this data is widely available),
but a significant time lag usually occurs between a corporation’s pursuit of a tax strategy and litigation before any court, let alone the
Supreme Court.253 These findings may have important implications
for scholars, policymakers, and litigators, but they are admittedly of
little use to practitioners during the planning stages of corporate
transactions. We expect that many of our findings will have important
and interesting applications for private practitioners and government
lawyers in various contexts.
1.

Private Practitioners

Our study has implications for private practitioners who seek to
reduce the risk of a judicial decision that unwinds a corporate tax
planning strategy and for those who simply desire a better understanding of these risks.
First, our study suggests that private practitioners can increase
the likelihood that the Supreme Court will respect their planning
choices if they structure transactions that do not feature both the
250 See DEPT. OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 25–31 (July 1999).
251 See supra Part I.A.2 (describing the uncertain nature of judicial anti-abuse
standards).
252 See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
253 See Blank, supra note 41, at 573–74 (discussing the “tax shelter time lag”); Tanina
Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE
J. ON REG. 77, 87 (2006) (describing the “lengthy time lag” between the execution of a tax
shelter and its eventual detection by the IRS).
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participation of third parties and multiple transaction steps.254 Put differently, practitioners should be aware that the use of simpler transaction structures that involve only a third party or only multiple
transaction steps appear to best protect corporations from judicial
anti-abuse standards. Again, in our future research, we will investigate
whether this specific effect occurs in federal appellate and trial courts.
Our study also reveals that the procedural posture of a tax controversy has a significant effect on its outcome.255 As noted above,
when a tax controversy arises from the IRS’s denial of a corporation’s
claim for a refund, instead of from an IRS agent’s own discovery of a
deficiency item during an audit, the government’s chances of success
in litigation increase significantly.256 One explanation for this outcome
is that the framing of the controversy as a dispute over the corporation’s request for a refund of taxes from the government, as opposed
to one that involves an underpayment of taxes to the government, may
influence the Justices’ views of abuse.257 A possible implication of our
study is that private practitioners may protect against the application
of judicial anti-abuse standards by designing tax strategies that do not
require the corporation to file a refund claim with the IRS on its original or amended return. For example, rather than structuring a transaction where a corporation files a refund claim as a result of using a
net operating loss carry back (which would necessitate the filing of a
separate refund claim),258 practitioners could design tax strategies that
involve a decrease in the corporation’s reported taxable income on its
return. Our findings show that, at least in the Supreme Court, a corporation will fare much better if the controversy centers on an underreporting controversy than on the amount of money a corporation can
extract from the federal fisc.259
Finally, the Court has not looked favorably on corporate tax
strategies that result in divergent positions on financial accounting
documents and filed tax returns. While such book-tax differences260
do not necessarily mean that the corporation will be denied its
254

See supra Part II.B.2.a.
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
256 See id.
257 For a discussion of the framing of refunds and tax payments, see John S. Carroll,
How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES
43, 60 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). See also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The
Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 731 n.205 (2007)
(describing how tax law favors transactions involving third parties).
258 See IRS Form 1120X (Jan. 2011), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120x.pdf; see
also I.R.C. § 172(a) (2006) (defining a net operating loss carryback).
259 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
260 For a description of book-tax differences, see supra notes 103–04 and accompanying
text.
255
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preferred tax position, they raise a red flag to IRS auditors and judges
alike that tax avoidance might be at hand. Our findings are yet
another indication that corporate transactional lawyers should be
wary of transactions that result in book-tax differences, or should at
least inform clients of the potential risks of judicial recharacterization.
2.

Government Lawyers

Although government lawyers will not utilize our findings to plan
tax strategies and transactions (this function is carried out by private
practitioners), they may nonetheless be able to make use of several of
our empirical results when planning litigation strategies.
Our findings suggest that government lawyers should be hesitant
to litigate against corporate taxpayers in the Supreme Court if the
basis of their case rests on the assertion that the taxpayer lacked a
non-tax business purpose for pursuing a transaction. Our results indicate that Supreme Court Justices generally rely on the corporation’s
view of business purpose and generally are not convinced to unwind a
deal simply because the government alleges a business purpose is
lacking.261 Our study also indicates that government lawyers make a
strategic litigation error when they focus excessively on a single factor
of abuse—or build their case by pointing to as many indicia of abuse
as possible.262 Instead, government lawyers should focus on the two
most objective factors, multiple steps and third parties, and use these
factors not alone but in combination when challenging a transaction.
Further, our models consistently suggest that when the nation’s
defense spending spikes, the likelihood that the government will prevail also increases. The underlying judicial motivation for this progovernment position has been extensively explored elsewhere;263 for
our purposes we simply note that just as private practitioners should
consider the external environment, government lawyers should consider factors beyond the parameters of the case in order to succeed.
3.

Settlement Negotiations

Our study could shape corporate tax planning strategies in the
short term and litigation strategies over the long term, but it may also
affect settlement discussions.264 For instance, if a corporation filed a
261

See supra text accompanying notes 191–92.
For example, the government provides a lengthy list of possible indicia of abuse in its
guidance to its agents regarding the newly codified economic substance doctrine. See
Guidance for Examiners and Managers, supra note 100.
263 See generally STAUDT, supra note 163.
264 See CLIFF JERNIGAN, CORPORATE TAX AUDIT SURVIVAL 81–84 (2005) (describing
the audit and settlement process for large corporations).
262
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tax refund claim with the IRS, engaged in a multistep transaction with
outside parties, and is defending its plan in the Supreme Court after
winning in the lower appellate court, then that corporation should
expect to lose in the Supreme Court.265 If the case reaches the docket
during a wartime emergency, the taxpayer’s chances of success fall
further and, thus, settlement should be viewed as an acceptable option
given the high risk of losing.266 Indeed, even if the transaction avoids
those factors that our study suggests cause the Court to decide in the
government’s favor, but the Justices decide to hear the case on appeal
by the government while the nation is at war, the corporation should
again seriously consider settlement. Our empirical findings, of course,
must be refined and modified by case-specific factors, factors known
by lawyers due to their own background knowledge and expertise in a
particular case.
The same type of analyses can be conducted with respect to the
government. If the government relies on the lack of a business purpose to convince the Court to unwind a transaction, and the Court
agrees to hear the case on the taxpayer’s certiorari petition in a period
of peace, the government is unlikely to prevail.267 Government lawyers, consequently, should focus on other factors discussed above in
designing their litigation strategies or, alternatively, consider settlement. Again, this presumes an absence of competing concerns known
by the lawyers due to their own professional experience.
Not only do we believe that our modeling efforts can advance the
interests of lawyers and litigators when it comes to strategizing and
settling, but we also believe the judiciary itself will benefit. Our study
illuminates judicial decisionmaking in corporate tax abuse cases, a
process that has long been viewed as elusive. This study provides a
greater level of predictability to the decisionmaking process, a feature
widely believed to be associated with fair and just decisionmaking.268
We do not express a normative view regarding whether judicial uncertainty increases tax compliance or serves any other purpose. However,
we are confident that the judiciary itself would benefit from a statistical analysis of judicial decisionmaking in the corporate tax abuse
context given that this transparency would encourage parties in federal appellate disputes to reach settlements and, consequently, avoid
the use of judicial resources.
265

See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.
See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
267 See supra Parts II.B.2.a, II.B.2.d.
268 For a discussion of these issues and a review of the literature, see Nancy C. Staudt,
Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52
EMORY L.J. 771, 836–46 (2003).
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Should Business Purpose Matter?

In addition to offering possible guidance to private practitioners,
IRS agents, and government lawyers, our study also elicits normative
questions regarding the utility of the business purpose doctrine as an
anti-abuse mechanism. The Supreme Court has described the business
purpose doctrine as necessary to ensure that a taxpayer’s transaction
is “imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped
solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels
attached . . . .”269 The presence of a business purpose is often of paramount importance to tax practitioners when structuring transactions,270 and the standard now appears in the text of the IRC itself.271
Yet, as the discussion above reveals, commentators have criticized the
business purpose standard as a weak barrier against abuse.272 While
the scope of this study is limited to Supreme Court decisions, it suggests, for the first time using empirical evidence, that the criticism
voiced by these commentators may deserve further consideration.273
Our findings show that when the government alleges that the taxpayer lacked a non-tax business purpose, which almost always results
in a counterargument from the corporate taxpayer,274 the issue has no
statistically significant effect on the judicial outcome.275 A possible
explanation for this finding is that when the issue of a non-tax-related
business purpose arises in a corporate tax abuse controversy, the government and the corporate taxpayer may offer equally convincing
arguments. The potential positive effect of a business purpose allegation on the government’s chance of success is thus negated by the taxpayer’s effective counterargument. Another possibility is that in
corporate tax abuse controversies that reach the Supreme Court, the
issue of whether the transaction possesses a non-tax business purpose
is not as central to the dispute as other issues.276 A final intriguing possibility is that the Justices may not believe that a
269

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978).
See, e.g., Canellos, supra note 108, at 52 (characterizing transactions motivated by
non-tax business purpose as “real transactions”); Ferguson, supra note 107, at 727–28
(describing the importance of “business purpose” to courts’ analyses of transactions).
271 I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) (stating that a transaction has economic substance if “the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from federal income tax effects) for
entering into such transaction”).
272 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 132, at 1962.
273 See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
274 See David P. Hariton, The Frame Game: How Defining the “Transaction” Decides
the Case, 63 TAX LAW. 1, 1 (2009) (“[T]he battle in the courts is primarily about ‘framing’
the transaction as consisting of either the narrower tax-motivated structures or steps . . . or
of the broader business objectives . . . .”).
275 See supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
276 See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 174, at 174 (discussing possible selection effects).
270
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non-tax-motivated purpose for a transaction can be separated from a
tax-motivated purpose as neatly as some commentators suggest.277 In
any case, this finding appears to confirm the criticism of many commentators that the Justices may view the business purpose requirement as a standard that can be manipulated by both the taxpayer and
the government and thus is neither probative nor decisive for legal
analytic purposes.
Further, in some cases, the Court may be more inclined to accept
the corporation’s business purpose argument than the government’s
tax abuse accusation. As our study shows, in corporate tax abuse cases
when the government alleges a lack of business purpose and that a
third party was involved in the transaction at issue, the government’s
probability of success decreases.278 This reaction may occur because
the Court may perceive the presence of a third party in a transaction
as signaling that, as the corporation argues, the transaction at issue
satisfied some genuine non-tax business purpose. This finding supports the view of many commentators that the business purpose standard does not enable the government to attack corporate tax abuse
effectively.279
Our discussion suggests that policymakers should consider
adopting an alternative to the business purpose standard in order to
prevent corporate tax abuse.280 Potential policy candidates include
proposals that attempt to identify corporate tax abuse without
requiring a subjective, intent-based analysis. For example, the objective loss disallowance rule that Professors Marvin Chirelstein and
Lawrence Zelenak have proposed would prohibit tax losses that do
not mirror economic losses and would not require a court to analyze
the corporation’s business purpose for pursuing particular transactions.281 Professor Daniel Shaviro has also offered a proposal that
highlights objective differences between a corporation’s reported taxable income and its financial income, along with tax penalties based
on the difference as a means to deter abuse.282 Several other proposals
employ similar objective approaches in an effort to detect and deter
277

See, e.g., supra note 270.
See supra Part II.B.2.a for an explanation of these findings.
279 See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text (describing commentators’ criticism
of application of judicial anti-abuse standards).
280 While our study provides empirical evidence that the business purpose standard may
not serve the government’s interests, we do not endorse any particular alternative proposal
that has been offered.
281 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 132, at 1953–55.
282 Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial
Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J. 423, 472–83 (2009).
278
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corporate tax abuse.283 Our study bolsters the arguments set forth by
critics of the business purpose standard. We thus provide further justification for the argument in favor of anti-abuse proposals that eliminate subjective analysis of the taxpayer’s intent.
CONCLUSION
Many corporations seek to lower their tax bills with the help of
creative tax planning. While the best and most ingenious strategies
adhere to the letter of the law, government lawyers routinely challenge these strategies as mere deception and manipulation. This
Article examines government challenges to these alleged corporate
shams in an effort to determine how and why the Supreme Court
determines when ostensibly legal behavior has shaded into abuse and
fraud.284 In an effort to provide insight into this decisionmaking process, previous researchers conducted qualitative case studies and proposed standards and rules that would lead to better and more
predictable judicial outcomes. This Article adopts a new approach by
undertaking the first large-n quantitative study of Supreme Court taxabuse decisions in an effort to identify the trends that could not be
observed in the prior studies.
Our empirical results run counter to the conventional wisdom
that judges do not follow predictable patterns when deciding corporate abuse cases. We uncover a collection of factors that systematically
lead Supreme Court Justices to favor (or disfavor) the government in
the controversies that appear on the Court’s docket. By explaining the
judicial decisionmaking process and the factors linked to specific judicial outcomes, we believe that our study will increase knowledge and
understanding of the law that governs and defines corporate abuse.
This more nuanced understanding of corporate tax law, in turn, should
have important practical implications for private practitioners, government lawyers, and policymakers.

283

See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposals.
The use of standards to combat the unintended results that stem from a literalist use
of rules occurs in other areas of the law as well. See Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill,
Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1156
(2010) (“Law typically seeks to avoid the potentially absurd extremes of rules or formalistic interpretations of statutory text through the use of ex post standards . . . .”).
284
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APPENDIX:
CORPORATE TAX ABUSE CASES IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
1909–2011
This Appendix contains the 137 cases that we designated as “corporate tax abuse cases” in our study. These cases involve a corporate
tax controversy in which the government alleged in its brief that the
corporation’s tax strategy was abusive.285
Case

Citation

Year

McCoach v. Minehill & Schuylkill Haven R.R.

228 U.S. 295

1913

Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.

242 U.S. 503

1917

United States v. Biwabik Mining Co.

247 U.S. 116

1918

United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co.

265 U.S. 189

1924

Lederer v. Fidelity Trust Co.

267 U.S. 17

1925

Duffy v. Cent. R.R. of N.J.

268 U.S. 55

1925

Edwards v. Cuba R.R.

268 U.S. 628

1925

Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins

269 U.S. 110

1925

United States v. Bos. Ins. Co.

269 U.S. 197

1925

United States v. Anderson

269 U.S. 422

1926

Edwards v. Chile Copper Co.

270 U.S. 452

1926

Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.

271 U.S. 170

1926

Hellmich v. Mo. Pac. R.R.

273 U.S. 242

1927

Am. Nat’l Co. v. United States

274 U.S. 99

1927

Willcuts v. Milton Dairy Co.

275 U.S. 215

1927

Lewellyn v. Elec. Reduction Co.

275 U.S. 243

1927

United States v. Bos. & Me. R.R.

279 U.S. 732

1929

United States v. Am. Can Co.

280 U.S. 412

1930

Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co.

281 U.S. 115

1930

Lucas v. Kan. City Structural Steel Co.

281 U.S. 264

1930

Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States

281 U.S. 357

1930

Handy & Harman v. Burnet

284 U.S. 136

1931

Am. Hide & Leather Co. v. United States

284 U.S. 343

1932

285 As we have stated, these cases involve corporate rather than individual tax liability.
Consequently, the list does not contain certain “classic” Supreme Court cases involving
abusive tax strategies, such as Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In that famous
case, the principal issue was the tax treatment of Mrs. Gregory, an individual shareholder,
on her receipt and sale of Monitor Corporation stock. Id. at 467. The issue was not the tax
treatment of the corporations that Mrs. Gregory owned. Id. As a result, we did not designate this tax case, or several others like it, as “corporate tax cases” or “corporate tax abuse
cases.”
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Citation

Year

U.S. Cartridge Co. v. United States

284 U.S. 511

1932

Bowers v. Lawyers Mortg. Co.

285 U.S. 182

1932

Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States

286 U.S. 285

1932

Cont’l Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States

286 U.S. 290

1932

Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose

286 U.S. 319

1932

N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet

286 U.S. 417

1932

Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet

287 U.S. 299

1932

Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet

287 U.S. 308

1932

Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm’r

287 U.S. 462

1933

Burnet v. Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co.

287 U.S. 544

1933

Atl. City Electric Co. v. Comm’r

288 U.S. 152

1933

Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez

292 U.S. 62

1934

Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r

292 U.S. 382

1934

McLaughlin v. Pac. Lumber Co.

293 U.S. 351

1934

Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Ins. Co.

294 U.S. 686

1935

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States

296 U.S. 60

1935

Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering

296 U.S. 200

1935

Morrissey v. Comm’r

296 U.S. 344

1935

Swanson v. Comm’r

296 U.S. 362

1935

Helvering v. Combs

296 U.S. 365

1935

Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs.

296 U.S. 369

1935

John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering

296 U.S. 374

1935

Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co.

296 U.S. 378

1935

G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Helvering

296 U.S. 389

1935

Bus & Transp. Sec. Corp. v. Helvering

296 U.S. 391

1935

Great W. Power Co. v. Comm’r

297 U.S. 543

1936

Helvering v. Ill. Life Ins. Co.

299 U.S. 88

1936

Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co.

300 U.S. 216

1937

Founders Gen. Corp. v. Hoey

300 U.S. 268

1937

Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co.

300 U.S. 481

1937

A.A. Lewis & Co. v. Comm’r

301 U.S. 385

1937

Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering

302 U.S. 609

1938

Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.

303 U.S. 376

1938

United States v. Hendler

303 U.S. 564

1938

Helvering v. Nat’l Grocery Co.

304 U.S. 282

1938

M.E. Blatt Co. v. United States

305 U.S. 267

1938

Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

306 U.S. 110

1939
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Citation

Year

First Chrold Corp. v. Comm’r

306 U.S. 117

1939

Helvering v. Metro. Edison Co.

306 U.S. 522

1939

Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co.

308 U.S. 252

1939

Real Estate–Land Title & Trust Co. v. United States

309 U.S. 13

1940

United States v. A.S. Kreider Co.

313 U.S. 443

1941

United States v. Joliet & Chi. R.R. Co.

315 U.S. 44

1942

Helvering v. Ala. Asphaltic Limestone Co.

315 U.S. 179

1942

Palm Springs Holding Corp. v. Comm’r

315 U.S. 185

1942

Bondholders Comm. v. Comm’r

315 U.S. 189

1942

Helvering v. Sw. Consol. Corp.

315 U.S. 194

1942

Magruder v. Wash., Balt. & Annapolis Realty Corp.

316 U.S. 69

1942

Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp.

316 U.S. 107

1942

Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc.

316 U.S. 527

1942

Helvering v. Sabine Transp. Co.

318 U.S. 306

1943

Helvering v. Chi. Stock Yards Co.

318 U.S. 693

1943

Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm’r

319 U.S. 98

1943

Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering

319 U.S. 523

1943

Sec. Flour Mills Co. v. Comm’r

321 U.S. 281

1944

Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Comm’r

321 U.S. 560

1944

United States v. Seattle–First Nat’l Bank

321 U.S. 583

1944

Wis. Gas & Electric Co. v. United States

322 U.S. 526

1944

Comm’r v. Court Holding Co.

324 U.S. 331

1945

John Kelley Co. v. Comm’r

326 U.S. 521

1946

Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r

326 U.S. 599

1946

Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Comm’r

328 U.S. 25

1946

United States v. Ogilvie Hardware Co.

330 U.S. 709

1947

Comm’r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co.

333 U.S. 496

1948

Nat’l Carbide Corp. v. Comm’r

336 U.S. 422

1949

United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co.

338 U.S. 451

1950

Brown Shoe Co. v. Comm’r

339 U.S. 583

1950

United States v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.

350 U.S. 55

1955

Comm’r v. Sw. Exploration Co.

350 U.S. 308

1956

United States v. Leslie Salt Co.

350 U.S. 383

1956

Millinery Ctr. Bldg. Corp. v. Comm’r

350 U.S. 456

1956

Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler

353 U.S. 382

1957

Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc.

356 U.S. 260

1958

United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co.

364 U.S. 76

1960
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Citation

Year

Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States

364 U.S. 92

1960

Hertz Corp. v. United States

364 U.S. 122

1960

Am. Auto. Ass’n v. United States

367 U.S. 687

1961

Riddell v. Monolith Portland Cement Co.

371 U.S. 537

1963

Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Comm’r

380 U.S. 624

1965

United States v. Midland-Ross Corp.

381 U.S. 54

1965

Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Comm’r

383 U.S. 272

1966

United States v. Donruss Co.

393 U.S. 297

1969

United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.

397 U.S. 580

1970

Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah

405 U.S. 394

1972

Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co.

417 U.S. 134

1974

Cent. Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States

417 U.S. 673

1974

Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co.

418 U.S. 1

1974

Ivan Allen Co. v. United States

422 U.S. 617

1975

Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r

429 U.S. 569

1977

United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co.

430 U.S. 725

1977

Fulman v. United States

434 U.S. 528

1978

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States

435 U.S. 561

1978

HCSC-Laundry v. United States

450 U.S. 1

1981

United States v. Swank

451 U.S. 571

1981

United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.

455 U.S. 16

1982

Hollsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r

460 U.S. 370

1983

United States v. Hughes Props., Inc.

476 U.S. 593

1986

Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co.

482 U.S. 117

1987

United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.

481 U.S. 239

1987

Ark. Best Corp. v. Comm’r

485 U.S. 212

1988

Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r

491 U.S. 244

1989

United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

493 U.S. 132

1989

Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r

499 U.S. 554

1991

United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB

499 U.S. 573

1991

Holywell Corp. v. Smith

503 U.S. 47

1992

United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co.

504 U.S. 505

1992

Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus.

508 U.S. 152

1993

Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r

523 U.S. 382

1998

United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States

532 U.S. 822

2001

